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Abstract 
Passwords are a common means of identifying an individual user on a computer 
system. However, they are only as secure as the computer user is vigilant in keeping 
them confidential. This thesis presents new methods for the strengthening of password 
security by employing the biometric feature of keystroke dynamics. Keystroke 
dynamics refers to the unique rhythm generated when keys are pressed as a person types 
on a computer keyboard. The aim is to make the positive identification of a computer 
user more robust by analysing the way in which a password is typed and not just the 
content of what is typed. 
Two new methods for implementing a keystroke dynamic system utilising 
neural networks are presented. The probabilistic neural network is shown to perform 
well and be more suited to the application than traditional backpropagation method. An 
improvement of 6% in the false acceptance and false rejection errors is observed along 
with a significant decrease in training time. A novel time sequenced method using a 
cascade forward neural network is demonstrated. This is a totally new approach to the 
subject of keystroke dynamics and is shown to be a very promising method 
The problems encountered in the acquisition of keystroke dynamics which, are 
often ignored in other research in this area, are explored, including timing 
considerations and keyboard handling. The features inherent in keystroke data are 
explored and a statistical technique for dealing with the problem of outlier datum is 
implemented. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Security of I. T. Systems 
In our increasingly connected world of information systems, security is 
becoming a serious issue. The vulnerability of information increases with greater 
accessibility. The conflict between distributed access to information and the security of 
that information is a problem which may never be completely solved. For many years 
the security of sensitive information has relied on physical barriers; papers locked in 
filing cabinets or even safes. The same physical barrier protection remains today on 
high security computer installations which are not networked. Stand alone personal 
computers are used with removable hard drives (often encrypted) which are locked 
securely in a safe when not in use. While this method of securing information is not 
totally secure, as it relies on the integrity of the users with access, it keeps the risk of a 
breach in security to a minimum by eliminating all but one path of access to the 
information. 
Such physical barriers are not possible in a networked environment and this 
environment is set to grow even further in the next few years. With the coming of 
wireless networking, a whole new range of devices will have a presence on the internet. 
These will range from washing machines to third generation (3G) mobile phones and 
personal digital assistants (PDA's). As more sensitive information is made accessible, 
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 1 
Introduction 
such as bank accounts, personal email, addresses and schedules, there will be a 
heightened awareness and a greater need for security. The opportunities that trading 
across the internet offers will only be realised if there is a confidence amongst 
consumers to know who they are dealing with and conversely, a confidence amongst 
retailers that their customers are genuine. 
Computers are becoming more secure with the addition of firewalls, strong 
encryption and more secure logon procedures for users, to name a few. However, with 
the continuing threat of viruses such as "Trojan Horses" (programs which secretly allow 
others access to your information) and key loggers (programs which foil encryption by 
intercepting keystrokes at the keyboard) it is clear there is still much to be done. Whilst 
there are various methods under development to increase security, they all rely on one 
thing - identity. 
1.2 Identification 
The ability for an individual to be identified with confidence is a problem in 
which there is a great deal of interest. Knowledge of a persons identity is generally 
obtained by using three distinct methods: 
1. What a person has - Tokens 
2. What a person knows - Knowledge 
3. What a person is - Biometrics 
The first method of tokens relies on what a person has. Keys are a common type 
of token, used to grant us access to our houses and cars. They require nothing else but 
the physical object itself to be of use. The disadvantage of token identification is the 
need to carry objects and the ease of which they can fall into the wrong hands by being 
lost, copied or stolen. The second method relies on the knowledge of an individual. PIN 
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numbers are an example of knowledge based identification. They have the advantage of 
not requiring a physical object to be carried around but are prone to being forgotten, 
guessed or discovered (often written on a piece of paper). The third method, biometrics, 
is probably the oldest and most common method that humans and animals use. We are 
continuously identifying people by recognising faces. More recently other features such 
as signatures, fingerprints, retina patterns and hand geometry have be used. However, 
automated security systems utilising biometric features are rare in comparison to the 
other two methods. This is mainly due to the expense of developing and installing such 
systems. 
These methods can be used separately, but are often combined. For example, 
Credit Cards incorporate all three methods: tokens, knowledge and biometrics. 
Although only two of these methods are used at any one time. This is due to suitability 
of the identification method in the two scenarios in which the credit card is used. At a 
cash machine the card (token) must be presented, but also a PIN number remembered 
(knowledge). It is easy for a cash machine to check a number but much harder to 
analyse a signature. During a till transaction the card (token) must be produced but the 
person must also provide a signature (biometric). Again, it is easy for a human to 
analyse a signature, but it would be difficult and expensive to supply a machine to check 
PIN numbers in every outlet where the card is accepted. 
Of all these methods of identifying an individual person, the password has 
become dominant in the realm of information systems. It is often only a simple 
password that is required to access the private key data that allows strongly encrypted 
data to be revealed. The password has become dominant as it is suited to the 
environment in which it is used. It has the advantage over other methods of not 
requiring any extra hardware and being easy to implement. But this proliferation of 
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passwords has led to some problems with the security that the password provides. 
1.3 Another Password 
Over the last few years there has been an explosion in the use of passwords, 
helped in part by the growth of the internet. Nowadays it seems every website you visit 
requires one. With so many passwords to remember, people are becoming careless and 
the security that the password once provided is slowly becoming eroded. Passwords are 
a knowledge based identification method and as such have always been prone to the 
problems associated with these systems. The three main disadvantages are: 
1. Forgotten 
2. Guessed 
3. Discovered 
The first disadvantage is that passwords are prone to being forgotten. Many 
people use obvious phrases for their passwords (such as their first name, dogs name, 
favourite band, etc... ) in an attempt to make them easier to remember. Unfortunately this 
makes passwords easier to `guess', increasing problems with the second disadvantage. 
Most system administrators attempt to force users to choose strong passwords (which 
are harder to guess) by setting limits on the length of password and combination of 
letters or numbers that it may contain. However, these stronger passwords are harder to 
remember and some users promptly forget them. So many users take to writing 
passwords down, often leaving them in an insecure place. It can be seen from this 
example that each of these factors depends on the others. A password that is harder to 
guess, may be easier to forget - requiring that it is written down, which, in turn increases 
the risk of it becoming discovered. 
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One of the biggest problems with password security is complacency. With so 
many passwords being required from the user, many simply use the same password for 
every system. If this password was to become compromised all the users information on 
other systems would become vulnerable. 
The password will probably become outdated at some point in the future as other 
methods of identification are introduced (fingerprint recognition systems are already 
being incorporated on high end laptop computers). However, the widespread use of 
these alternative systems may not happen for some considerable time and the password 
may always be useful for some applications. With all these demands being placed on the 
integrity of the password, it can be seen there is scope for considerable improvement. 
This thesis attempts to offer a solution to the problem by combining the 
knowledge of the password with a biometric feature. This is comparable to the way a 
credit card increases security by utilising more than one method to identify an 
individual. 
1.4 Biometrics 
The term `Biometrics' is used to describe measurable features of the human 
body. A biometric feature becomes a useful tool to identify a person when it exhibits a 
certain degree of uniqueness to that person. Other qualities, such as stability over a 
period of time and ease of acquiring measurements are important. These biometric 
features can be split into two groups: 
1. Physical Biometrics 
2. Behavioural Biometrics 
Physical biometrics describe features such as fingerprints, iris patterns, retina 
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patterns, DNA codes, faces, hand geometry, weight and height. Any measurable feature 
of the body which is a physical entity is assigned to this group. Features such as DNA 
and fingerprints have been used successfully for sometime - but problems in acquiring 
the measurements have so far kept their use specialised. his patterns hold a great deal of 
promise [22]. They show some of the best qualities of uniqueness, are very stable over 
time (protected within the eye) and can be acquired easily and cheaply with a CCD 
camera, although poor lighting and focus can affect acquisition. 
The main disadvantage of many of these techniques, apart from the cost of 
hardware, is the active role which any user of the system must take. They require a 
person to learn how to use a new piece of equipment. There is also a time cost 
associated with the use of these systems. For example, on more primitive iris capture 
devices, the users themselves are required to ensure their iris image is in focus by 
moving their eye forwards or backwards until the correct focal length is obtained. This 
procedure will only take a small amount of time, but if it is required to be repeated 
frequently, or if there is a large number of people to be processed, it will become an 
issue. 
Behavioural biometrics describe features such as signatures and voice patterns. 
Any measurable behaviour that a person exhibits is placed into this group. Behavioural 
biometric techniques can be unique to an individual and stable over time. There has 
been some considerable work done on signatures and voice recognition. Devices such as 
mobile phones, user interfaces in some cars and computer software are available and 
can recognise a user's voice. A lesser known biometric feature is that of typing 
behaviour. This biometric technique utilises the fact that individual people, when typing 
on a computer keyboard, do so with a rhythm that is unique to them. This rhythm can be 
extracted as a pattern of time intervals measured when keys are pressed. The 
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individuality of these typing rhythms can be exploited in the creation of a secure method 
for identifying individual persons. 
1.5 Method 
The term given to this technique of extracting a behavioural biometric from 
typing rhythms is keystroke dynamics. The task of identifying a person from their 
keystroke dynamics is a pattern recognition problem. Early reported methods for 
keystroke dynamic systems utilised statistically based pattern recognition techniques 
[1]. Recently, better results for classifying individuals have been obtained with neural 
network based methods [5]. Neural networks are becoming valuable tools for solving a 
wide variety of pattern recognition problems. This thesis expands on these neural 
network techniques by applying the probabilistic neural network and the cascade 
forward neural network to the problem. The probabilistic neural network was selected 
as a candidate for its known ability to generalise well and fit to the optimal Bayesian 
solution given enough data. Other advantages such as its parallel structure and quick 
learning were important factors, allowing users to be added and removed with minimal 
re-training. The cascade forward neural network was implemented with a novel 
interpolation method which is based on the CFNN's ability to fit to a time-sequenced 
series of samples. 
1.6 Aims of this thesis 
This thesis presents a new method of securing passwords by incorporating a 
biometric feature in addition to the knowledge of the password. The aim is to 
investigate the monitoring of a person's typing behaviour in order to increase the 
security of passwords on a computer system. It will be shown that by analysing the 
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pattern generated by the timing of keypresses on a keyboard it is possible to improve the 
security of passwords. 
The field of keystroke dynamics is not as well developed as some other 
biometric techniques. This is due to other methods being favoured such as fingerprint 
recognition, as applications for these (e. g. policing, passport control) were historically 
of greater significance than securing computer access. However, as the use of 
computing has grown so much, interest in keystroke dynamics as a viable solution has 
increased. An exploration of the few methods reported for the implementation of 
keystroke dynamics is undertaken. The possible variations in the application of 
keystroke dynamics are discussed. A new approach utilising the probabilistic neural 
network (PNN) is compared with statistical techniques and feed-forward neural 
networks trained with the back propagation algorithm (BPNN). The thesis attempts to 
show that the use of keystroke dynamics is a viable proposition. 
1.7 Contributions of this thesis 
" This thesis presents a new method of keystroke dynamics utilising the 
probabilistic neural network (PNN). 
"A comparison of the PNN with current methods available is described. 
"A new method of improving false rejection performance by pre- 
processing keystroke data is implemented. 
"A novel method using the cascade forward neural network (CFNN) 
9 An examination of keystroke patterns and features. 
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1.8 Structure of thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background to the field 
of keystroke dynamics. The previous work in the field is covered briefly followed by an 
introduction to the ways in which keystroke dynamics can be implemented and the 
techniques applied. Chapter 3 discusses the problems associated with the acquisition of 
keystroke timing data and the features of that acquired data are described. Chapter 4 
introduces simple statistical techniques for the implementation of keystroke dynamics 
and explores the use of two different vector distance measures. Chapter 5 deals with a 
traditional backpropagation approach to the problem and demonstrates the uniqueness 
of keystroke timing data with an identification based experiment. Chapter 6 details a 
new approach to keystroke dynamics utilising a probabilistic neural network. This is 
shown to perform better for biased data and train faster than the BPNN. Its other 
benefits such as output consistency and confidence of decision are explored. Chapter 7 
is a novel approach which uses a windowed time sequenced method of interpreting the 
keystroke data with a cascade forward neural network. A comparison of the other 
method is given. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Keystroke Dynamics 
2.1 Review of Keystroke Dynamics Publications 
Keystroke Dynamics has not received the level of attention that other biometric 
techniques such as fingerprint and voice recognition have commanded. Consequently, 
there is not a great deal of published work available on the subject. The major 
contributions arise from a few sources with an active interest in this area. However, as 
there is no publicly available `benchmark' data set, all these sources utilise their own 
sets of data. This makes it difficult to directly compare results from different sources. 
This is a fact that must be taken into consideration for the remainder of this section, 
which provides a summary of the current works in the field. 
One of the early significant journal publications on keystroke dynamics was 
published in 1985 [1]. In this work the authors hypothesised that the time intervals 
between successive keystrokes were related to the behaviour of the brain, and that bursts 
of keystrokes occurred between latency for thought. For this reason they limited the 
number of the keystrokes to be analysed in one burst as 6. No experimentation was 
given as to the origin of this number and it could also be argued that such pauses for 
thought are a behavioural trait worthy of measurement. The method was concerned with 
the identification of users. Individual users provided a sample of 1400 words as a 
reference. The system then compiled the times between different digraphs (the latency 
between two characters) and produced the reference template consisting of mean times 
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for each digraph. Timing resolution was only lms and latencies over 750ms were 
discarded from the samples set. For identification to occur, the system required the user 
to provide a typing sample of 300 characters in length. This requirement for such a large 
number of keystrokes would make the system more disruptive to the user than a regular 
logon. The paper concludes that the keystroke dynamics metric is unsuitable for 
identification but could be suitable for verification. 
A patent filed in 1986 [2] details a keystroke dynamics system where the users 
names and a short `login id' are used for identification purposes. This use of a shorter 
textual input makes the system far more acceptable for a real application. The classifier 
is based on the Mahalanobis distance measure, as this gives a statistical measure of the 
similarity between an individual's input and the reference profile, weighted by the 
overall consistency. The Mahalanobis distance function, given a test vector V0 is: 
MD=(V-Vo)C-'(V-V0) (2.1) 
where the reference vector is represented by V and the inverse of the empirical 
covariance matrix is given by 6-'. 
This essentially means that more consistent typists are granted less margin for 
error. An inconsistent typist would have a larger range over which intervals would be 
deemed to have originated from them. This enables the system to tighten the security for 
consistent typists, whilst allowing inconsistent typists a lower FR rate. This work also 
deals with outliers, hypothesising that they are generated by sporadic external events 
that distract the user, such as a door slamming or a telephone ringing. These are 
removed with two methods; spectral analysis and fourth moment filtering. The work 
quotes the probability of an unauthorised user gaining access as 0.0001, which seems to 
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be highly optimistic given findings in other research. It also quotes a FR error of 50% 
but does not provide an explanation as to how these figures are produced. The system 
brings in the concept of requiring multiple attempts by the correct user in order to log on 
- these are not evaluated individually but as a group - hence, a correct user would move 
steadily towards an acceptable MD level whereas an impostor would move steadily 
away for each access attempt. No results are provided to show that this is the case. 
In 1988 one of the more prolific authors on the subject submitted a PhD 
dissertation [3]. The work focused on both identification and verification. The 
identification required the users to type the phrase `UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI 
COLUMBIA'. The verification method utilised the users names. This work brought in a 
`shuffling' technique, where the user supplied two samples for classification and the 
best matching latencies from each sample were combined to make a new sample. 
Although this had the effect of requiring a longer login sequence, it proved to be useful 
in eliminating sporadic outlier values. The classification was implemented with a 
Bayesian statistical approach and the K-means minimum distance measure. Results 
were affected by one particularly inconsistent user, who was easily imitated by others. 
The timing resolution of Ims was fairly low. The results of this work can be reviewed in 
[6,7,81. 
In 1988 the authors of [2] followed up their work with the publication of [4]. 
This is built on their previous work and introduces uni, di and tetragraph analysis of the 
sample text. However, the method remained the same, and still required a sample of 300 
characters. Applying the system to a continuously monitored environment was studies 
in [9]. There was no new data available for this study and results relied on a `simulated' 
data set. Recognition was performed by analysing the most frequently occurring 
digraphs. The system took around 100 keystrokes to detect that an impostor had 
replaced the correct user. 
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A significant patent was filed in 1989 [5]. In this work, the timing resolution is 
given as lms, it introduces the possibility of using pressure sensitive keyboards to add 
an extra dimension to the system. The effectiveness of the system is described by the 
use of probability curves, where the area under the intersection of two probability 
distributions gives an indication of the effectiveness of the system. As this is a patent 
describing the method only, no results are given as to the performance of the system. 
The features used for the system were not explicitly stated, instead a range of possible 
features were described. These included the average keystroke latency, the average time 
to enter a common word (such as `the'), the standard deviation of the keystroke 
latencies and the minimum/maximum limits of the keystroke latencies. As some of 
these features may be more reliable than others, a method of weighting these features 
was described. The variance of the feature was used to determine its consistency, and 
hence its reliability. Applications of the system to areas other than securing computer 
access are given, such as ATM and telephone keypads. The patent described how a 
users typing behaviour could change over time. The system was able to compensate for 
this by adding an element of learning to the typing template. Small changes in the users 
behaviour would, after a number of occurrences, be included in the template by 
modifying the corresponding feature. 
The foundations of a later patent [10] are described in [11]. In this study the 
neural techniques of the ADALINE and BPNN are explored. The paper attempts to 
eliminate outlier data using a Kohonen clustering neural network. The timing resolution 
is given as lms. It concludes that while the ADALINE has the advantage of always 
finding the optimum solution, the non-linear pattern separation of the BPNN is better 
suited to the application. The short login strings are shown to provide enough 
information to implement an effective keystroke dynamics system. An improvement in 
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results was observed when using the Kohonen network. 
A higher timing resolution of O. lms was introduced by [12] & [13]. An 
interesting outcome of the work is the degradation in performance observed when 
normalising the keystroke timing vectors. Normalisation is often performed on raw data 
in pattern recognition applications, as some neural networks require data in the range -1 
to 1 (especially when using sigmoid transfer functions). However, a key feature in 
keystroke dynamics is the overall latency of the pattern. Normalisation preserves the 
pattern in the vector, but removes the information relating to the overall latency, thus 
reducing the differences between a slow and fast typist. Hence, poorer results were 
observed when normalisation was used. Three networks were implemented as 
classifiers; the BPNN, sum-of-products and a hybrid sum-of-products. The BPNN 
produced the best classification results, but required more training than the other two 
approaches. 
The methods of [9] were improved upon by introducing a weighting on the 
captured digraphs [14]. Outlier values were dealt with by simply excluding all digraphs 
above 500ms. 
A comprehensive test of common pattern recognition techniques including, 
cosine measure, BPNN, LVQ, RNN, HSOP, RBFN and ART-2 are described in [15]. 
The default keyboard handler was replaced to give accuracies of 0.1 ms and the ability to 
capture keyup and keydown events for the first time. Better results were observed when 
using both the keyup and keydown event for classification. Fuzzy logic approaches 
were covered in more detail in [16]. Here, keystroke digraphs were weighted according 
to the separation of the keys on the keyboard. The digraph average times were then 
applied to a set of fuzzy rules and the decision made on the centre of gravity of the 
result. There was no reasoning given as to the derivation of the fuzzy regions. 
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A report on continuous monitoring, centred on the more difficult problem of 
identification, is detailed in [17]. However, more than 50% of the collected data in the 
study was discarded for being too inconsistent. Out of the 42 users in the set, 11 were 
eliminated from the study for inconsistency. This highlights the difficulty of dealing 
with inconsistent users in an identification-based system. Classification was achieved 
using the Euclidean distance measure, a weighted probability score method and a non- 
weighted probability score method. The weighted probabilistic method gave the best 
results with a 90% correct identification of users (at the expense of excluding many of 
the samples from the experiment). 
A comparison of the fuzzy ART-2 method, the CPN and BPNN networks is 
described in [18]. The best results were achieved with the BPNN, but it took longer to 
train than the other methods, which achieved good results with less training overhead. 
This publication lead onto a significant paper detailing a comprehensive test of many 
different methods [19]. The results show neural network methods give a good level of 
performance compared to statistical techniques. The highest performing statistical 
method was the potential function method, closely followed by the Baye's rule 
classifier. 
The use of real user logins as a subject for verification was covered in [20]. 
Three classification methods were applied to the data; a minimum distance measure, a 
non-linear method (utilising the standard deviation) and an inductive learning method. 
The data capture method used both keyup and keydown events, timed with a resolution 
of 0.1 ms. Results were promising, considering the low number of keystrokes in a 
typical login string. The average length of login string was 6.4 characters. Even with 
this low number of keystrokes, results were comparable to those obtained in [19]. 
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A Java Applet written for verification using keystroke dynamics on websites is 
described by [21]. In this work the auto-associator neural network is compared to the k- 
means nearest neighbour approach. The Java Applet is used to acquire the keystroke 
latency times. The resolution of the timer for this method is given as 1 ms and both 
keyup and keydown events are utilised. However, there is no description of the exact 
method of obtaining the keystroke timing data. In a platform independent, high-level 
language such as Java, accessing the keyboard at a low level in order to obtain accurate 
readings is necessary. A concern that the collected samples would be corrupted by the 
underlying operating system buffering the keystrokes is not dealt with by the 
publication. The results obtained are very promising with an error rate quoted as I% for 
the auto-associator network. It is unclear whether this relates to the FAR or FRR or 
both. This low error rate was achieved through considerable manipulation of the data 
set. Of the samples collected, up to 50% were discarded for each user. The system 
required a large training set, up to 325 samples from each user, far more than could be 
expected of users in a `real' system. 
The classification methods described by previous works have shown neural 
networks to be strong candidates for this application. Statistical methods have faired 
less well, with the exception of probabilistic based approaches, such as Baye's rule [19]. 
It was therefore conceived that a combination of these methods might produce better 
results. The problem of eliminating outlier data in the typing samples has been 
highlighted in previous work [19]. Consequently, a method of pre-processing the 
sample data set is implemented in this work. 
The practise of eliminating whole samples or even individuals from the data set 
to improve results will not be applied in this work. Some precious work report results as 
a single combined figure for error. This does not give the whole picture. Therefore, all 
results in this work shall be given as FAR/FRR error pairs for each particular case. 
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It is helpful when looking at results to visualise the spread of the FAR/FRR 
errors for each case. In this work, results are displayed for the statistical classifiers in a 
new form (Figure 4.4). This enables the reader to see the spread of the errors that make 
up the error for the system as a whole. The FAR/FRR error is shown in the y-axis, with 
the x-axis referring to the threshold level employed in the system. 
The previous works have shown that the problem of identification is not easily 
solved with the use of keystroke dynamics. It is probable that this is inherent in the 
nature of the biometric, as it is more prone to change over time and similarity across 
individuals than physical biometrics such as fingerprints and DNA. This thesis will 
therefore be concerned with the problem of verification. 
2.2 Verification vs. Identification 
Biometric security systems, including keystroke dynamics, operate in one of two 
modes: 
1. Identification 
2. Verification 
Identification is the ultimate test of a biometric. The identity of a person must be 
determined from their given biometric. The system must search a database of known 
users and select the person to which the sample belongs. It must also be able to 
determine if the person is a stranger to the system; in this case it should fail to find a 
match amongst the set of known users. This is a task that we perform everyday when we 
recognise somebody's face. We take the biometric of a face and match it to a name that 
we have remembered. We can also tell strangers apart from known individuals with 
ease. However, the fact that we, as humans, find this an easy task, does not mean it is a 
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 17 
Keystroke Dynamics 
trivial problem. In order for a system to work as a recogniser, it must be able to 
confidently find a persons identity amongst a user base that may contain thousands, if 
not millions of users. Even the human brain would not be able to cope with such an 
amount of information. In fact, whilst we are good at recognising whether a face 
belongs to a stranger, we are not so good at remembering names. Some studies have 
suggested we have difficulty remembering more than one hundred names. This gives 
some idea of the enormous diversity that a biometric must contain if it is to be truly 
unique to an individual. 
It takes a special type of biometric to be suitable for identification purposes. It 
must have the properties of being highly individual to a specific person and stable over 
a period of time. For example, if the chances of someone having the same biometric as 
another individual are 10 million to 1, in a country such as the UK a search through the 
population of some 60 million may result in the person being identified as six 
individuals. Biometrics proved suitable for identification are the fingerprint, DNA code, 
retina pattern and the iris pattern. The iris pattern is proving to be a very promising 
method, details can be found in [22]. 
The task of verification is less demanding on the uniqueness of a biometric. In 
this role we are seeking to check that an individual is who they claim to be. Biometrics 
which are occurring similarly in only 1 in 1000 of population may be fairly effective for 
verification (but useless for identification). There is a reference in [5] to a claim that 
keystroke dynamics are as unique as the fingerprint, however, this is not backed up with 
any evidence. Indeed, to prove the uniqueness of keystroke dynamics would be an 
extremely difficult task, as typing data would need to be collected from a vast number 
of persons. Whilst this claim may not be proven, it does suggest keystroke dynamics 
may exhibit a fairly strong degree of uniqueness. 
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The main focus of the work in this thesis will be orientated towards verification. 
Identification will be covered briefly for a closed environment of a limited number of 
users. 
2.3 Continuous and Login Monitoring 
There are two approaches for improving security on computer systems using 
keystroke dynamics: 
1. Continuous Monitoring 
2. Login Monitoring 
Both of these methods can operate in either identification or verification mode. 
Continuous monitoring involves a continual evaluation of an individual's typing 
behaviour. In this scenario the text that the user is keying in is unknown to the system. 
Therefore, the information regarding the behaviour of the typist must be built from 
features which are inherent in their general typing behaviour. These features must be 
consistent no matter what is typed. This approach can be used for continuous 
monitoring of the typist during the duration of their session on a PC. The aim is to 
constantly monitor the use of the PC for unauthorised access. It is of most use when a 
PC is being used for word processing or other application that requires the regular use 
of the keyboard. A level of security is provided such that, if the authorised user left the 
PC unattended, an unauthorised user would be detected whilst using the keyboard. The 
keystroke monitoring system would not recognise the typing rhythm of the unauthorised 
user and subsequently deny access to the system. The difficulty with monitoring 
keystrokes continuously is developing a method of taking the large amount of data 
acquired and finding consistent features. This has been done in some methods by simply 
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looking for commonly occurring words (such as `the', `and', `where' and `there') and 
comparing the time patterns for these words with corresponding data of known patterns 
for the user. Other methods measure the time intervals between pairs of characters, for 
instance, the time between `A' and `S' or the time between `T' and `H'. These are then 
compiled and compared with a reference profile of previously generated data for the 
user. These time delays are often compiled into a digraph chart [1]. A digraph is the 
term given to a time interval between two characters. Although these digraphs reduce 
the amount of data which needs to be stored to represent a user's typing rhythm profile 
when compared to the method of commonly used words, the amounts of data associated 
with generating templates for both these methods are substantial. The data storage 
requirements are not the only disadvantages with this approach. Continuously analysing 
the timing data from a user will put the PC's processor under more load than usual. This 
may affect the performance of the computer system. Also, the continuous monitoring 
system only secures access via the keyboard, allowing an impostor to navigate the 
computer via the mouse or other input device. This degrades the effectiveness of the 
continuous monitoring approach on reinforcing security. It would seem only to have use 
where a PC is without an input device other than the keyboard, or on a system where the 
main threat to security can only be accomplished on a keyboard. Such a scenario is 
uncommon these days with the vast majority of PCs having a mouse. These factors may 
limit the potential uses of continuous keystroke monitoring. 
Login monitoring ascertains the user's authenticity only once, during the logon 
process. It builds on the traditional login procedure found on many computer networks 
by asking the user to type a known username and password. As the user types, it 
monitors their typing style and compares it with a known profile. Security is enhanced 
with this method, as an extra barrier to access is encountered, even if an impostor has 
obtained knowledge of another users password, as the system requires the impostor to 
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type the username and password with a similar rhythm to the authorised user. This 
makes it a very difficult task for an impostor, but a familiar procedure for most 
computer users. It can even be performed without the knowledge of the user. Hence, no 
user training is required to use this system. Some physical biometric techniques, such as 
fingerprint recognition, require the use of new hardware and procedures. Login 
monitoring has the advantage of an easier implementation than the continuous 
monitoring system, with a smaller requirement of PC resources. The computer's 
processor is only used once at the logon, therefore, it will not affect the subsequent 
performance of the PC. The storage requirements for the reference profile are also much 
reduced. Once the user has been granted access to the system there are no further checks 
on authenticity. However, depending on the level of security required, authentication 
could be demanded from the user for performing certain critical tasks (such as file 
copy/deletion) or, after a certain period of inactivity. This would help protect the system 
should a user leave the PC unattended while logged in. 
The techniques for continuously monitoring a users typing rhythm can also be 
applied to the logon procedure. Here, instead of just providing a username and 
password, the user must type a phrase, randomly generated by the PC and previously 
unseen by the user. The users typing style is then checked against a profile and access 
granted or denied. Some of the disadvantages with the continuous system apply here 
too, such as the large memory requirement of the profile. Also, the delay encountered 
by the user whilst typing this phrase may be unacceptable. 
The focus of this thesis will be login monitoring. The use of keystroke dynamics 
in this guise has the potential to apply a new, higher level of security to the vast 
majority of PC systems. 
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2.4 Pattern Recognition 
Pattern recognition (or discrimination) is an attempt to `guess' the nature of a 
previously unseen observation [24]. The nature of these observations may be any 
number of differing classes, which may or may not be known. If the different classes are 
known, the nature of the observation may be derived from previously seen examples. If 
the classes are unknown, grouping of observations may be inferred from clustering. 
Each observation is a vector of numerical data representing features (such as pixels in a 
digitised image). In keystroke dynamics the observation is often a vector of time 
intervals between keystrokes, obtained from a person typing on a computer keyboard. 
For a keystroke dynamic problem, the nature of the observation is generally known and 
could be either an authorised user or an impostor. 
2.5 Evaluating Performance 
Login monitoring with verification requires that a yes/no decision is made on a 
pattern presented to a classifier [25]. This is a common scenario within the field of 
pattern recognition. In all pattern recognition tasks of this nature there are four possible 
outcomes - either the pattern is the target or not and the decision made is either correct 
or not. The four possible outcomes in keystroke dynamics are: 
1. FA (False acceptance) - this is the case where an impostor is wrongly 
accepted by the classifier as the authorised user. 
2. FR (False rejection) - when the correct user is wrongly rejected by the 
classifier as an impostor. 
3. CA (Correct acceptance) - the authorised user is correctly accepted by 
the classifier. 
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4. CR (Correct rejection) - an impostor is correctly rejected by the 
classifier. 
It is clear that a good classifier seeks to minimise the errors FA & FR (known as 
Type I and Type II errors respectively) and maximise the correct decisions of CA & CR. 
Often the performance of biometric recognition systems is described by these measures. 
However, it is not these values alone which are important, but the relationship between 
them. It is possible to obtain a 0% false rejection error by simply accepting every access 
attempt. It is therefore necessary to quote figures for all these cases when describing the 
performance of a biometric security system. To give a clearer picture a graph can be 
drawn which shows the relationship between false acceptance and false rejection. 
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Figure 2.1 False Acceptance vs. False Rejection 
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In Figure 2.1 an example of an FA vs. FR graph is shown. It displays the two 
errors imperfectly separated by some discriminating measure. The line `D' represents a 
decision threshold. All values less than `D' are deemed to have originated from the 
correct users and all values greater from an impostor. Altering the threshold level `D', 
alters the ratio of FA to FR. By moving D to the left of the centre, FA is reduced but FR 
is increased - at the limit, FA is reduced to zero simply by rejecting every sample. 
Correspondingly the FR error in this case is 100%. 
The crossover point of these two graphs, marked `D', can be used to give an idea 
of the overall performance of the system. A lower error at the crossover point `D' 
indicates an improvement in performance. The shaded area represents the region of 
error, where misclassifications will occur. The smaller the shaded area, the better the 
performance. In a totally accurate system, these two areas would be perfectly separated. 
2.6 Enrolment 
Obtaining biometric features reliably is the first, crucial step, in any biometric 
system (Figure 2.2). Enrolment is the term given to the process of acquiring such 
features [22]. The degree of difficulty encountered during enrolment varies according to 
the individual properties of the biometric concerned. An example of a biometric with a 
difficult enrolment is iris recognition. The acquisition of iris patterns relies on capturing 
an image of the iris. The equipment involved must acquire an image of the iris which is 
properly focused [22]. During acquisition, the subject may move resulting in an image 
which is blurred and out of focus. If this image is of such poor quality that the features 
of the iris cannot be ascertained, then the enrolment of the biometric observation is 
deemed to have failed. Estimating the likely rate of a successful enrolment can be a 
difficult task. 
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Fortunately enrolment is not a big problem for keystroke dynamics. The patterns 
unique to an individual are inherent in the timings of keystrokes on the computer's 
keyboard. Any physical problems associated with acquiring keystrokes have been 
addressed by keyboard manufacturers long ago. The only perceived problems with the 
enrolment of keystroke dynamics is the possible corruption of the timing intervals by 
software. As this could be caused by the operating system or any number of applications 
running on a PC it may be difficult to detect if it occurs. 
Enrollment: 
Biornetric ýpture 
Sample 
Verification or Identification: 
Bion tric 
Sample (Pture 
Process Store 
YES 
Compare Decision 
Process 1! NO 
Figure 2.2 Overview of Biometric Identification System 
2.7 Applications 
The primary application for keystroke dynamics is seen as the personal 
computer. The major advantage of this technique over any physical biometric system is 
the speed with which it may be deployed across a network of computers. The costs 
associated are minimal and confined to the cost of the software. However, the 
application is not limited to the reinforcement of passwords on a personal computer, 
other uses of the system can be envisaged across a number of areas. 
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By monitoring the timing intervals of keypresses on a telephone keypad it is 
possible to extract a keystroke dynamic pattern of behaviour. This would require no 
modifications to any existing telephone at the acquiring end. The only requirement 
would be a system at the receiving end to monitor and time the DTMF tones produced 
by the acquiring phone. With such a system it may be possible for details such as credit 
card information to be keyed in to the phone and verified by the actual credit card 
number keystroke dynamics or by a PIN number keystroke dynamics supplied with it. 
ATM cash points are a possible area in which keystroke dynamics could 
increase security. In a similar manner to the telephone keypad system, the timing 
intervals could be acquired as a person types their PIN number on the cash point 
keypad. The need for an extremely low FR rate would be important here, as banks 
would not wish to inconvenience legitimate customers. The system could be used in 
conjunction with a habit tracking system. A user may not be refused access if they fail 
the keystroke dynamic test, but the transaction they wish to make could then be 
highlighted for scrutiny. Any transaction which is abnormal to the customers recorded 
spending habits could then be blocked. 
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Chapter 3 
Data Capture 
3.1 Accessing the Keyboard 
An essential part of any keystroke dynamics system is the acquisition of 
keystroke data from the keyboard. The information regarding the timing of keystrokes 
must be handled by the computer operating system in a manner which does not affect 
the accuracy of those measurements at the keyboard. A program or application running 
on a PC and performing keystroke dynamics must be able to access the keyboard at a 
low level. In a sophisticated high-level operating system such as WindowsTM, 
application access to peripheral devices such as the keyboard is controlled through an 
interface. This enables software developers to create applications without the need for 
their programs to handle the keyboard directly. Whilst this is advantageous to most 
applications, there are certain properties regarding the behaviour of this interface which 
are undesirable when obtaining keystroke dynamics. 
A multitasking operating system must share resources out amongst the various 
applications running on the platform. In order to allocate them effectively, priorities are 
assigned to every function. Housekeeping functions of the operating system such as 
hard drive and memory access are given a high priority. User inputs are given a low 
priority and often the user will have to wait while the system is busy. The keyboard has 
a buffer which allows the operating system to temporarily suspend the keyboard 
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handling, but allows the user to continue typing. When a high priority task needs to be 
run, the inputs from the keyboard are passed to the keyboard buffer. This can store a 
limited number of keystrokes until the high priority task is completed. An example of 
this can be seen in a word processor which has an `auto save' function. If a user is 
typing when a save needs to be performed, the characters momentarily freeze on the 
screen whilst the save is performed. When the save is completed the characters that 
have been typed whilst the screen was frozen, rapidly appear. This is the action of 
characters being released from the keyboard buffer and transferred to the application. 
Transferring keyboard strokes to applications in WindowsTM is accomplished by 
setting the value of a "windows message" to the character code of the depressed keys. 
When a key is pressed on the keyboard, the WindowsTM keyboard handler sends a 
`KEYDOWN' message to the active application with the code relating to the key. When 
a key is released, a `KEYUP' message is sent to the active application along with the 
key code. If WindowsTM interrupts the keyboard messages whilst it performs a higher 
priority task, it places the keystrokes in a buffer. Once the high priority task has 
finished, the buffer is flushed and all the stored keystrokes are sent to the application. 
Unfortunately, during this process the information about the timing of those keystrokes 
is lost. Therefore, in a keystroke dynamics system, another means of interfacing with 
the keyboard, which bypasses the default windows keyboard handler, is required. 
To bypass the original keyboard handler, a new one needs to be created which 
can ensure that the timing data acquired at the keyboard is not disturbed by the 
operating system. This is possible to implement on a WindowsTM PC and is actually 
widely used by games programmers. They also need such a low-level access to the 
keyboard, as the timing of keypresses is critical to the performance of a computer game. 
As the problem of timely access to the keyboard is overcome, the next problem is the 
measurement of these small time intervals that the keyboard handler generates. 
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3.2 Timing on a Computer 
A PC performing keystroke dynamics is also required to provide an accurate 
means of measuring the time intervals between keystrokes. Typically, time intervals 
between keypresses are in the order of milliseconds, with the most experienced typists 
creating the shortest intervals. Every PC has a system clock on the motherboard. Most 
time dependant functions depend on this device. However, this BIOS clock was not 
designed to provide accurate timing. Although it has an accuracy of 0.001 seconds, in 
actual fact this timer is only updated 18.2 times per second. This makes the resolution 
interval only 54.925ms. As some keystrokes can be shorter in duration than this, the 
BIOS clock is not suitable for use as a timing device for keystroke dynamics. 
Another approach is to use the computer processor unit (CPU) as a timing 
device. As the CPU processes many hundreds of thousands of operations per second, it 
provides excellent resolution as a timing device. CPU clock speeds vary between PCs, 
therefore, in order to maintain consistency across PCs, the CPU clock speed must be 
determined so that the timing interval can be converted to a standard unit. An easy way 
to accomplish this is to measure the number of processor clock cycles performed over a 
time interval with the BIOS clock. This time interval must be of a length that reduces 
the effect of the 18.2 samples per second resolution to negligible levels. With such 
calibration the time interval for a single clock cycle can be deduced. 
3.3 Experimental Environment 
Although it would be possible to implement accurate keystroke capture on a PC 
by replacing the keyboard handler of the OS with custom software, for the purposes of 
this research, a method of collecting keystroke dynamic data was sought which would 
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 29 
Data Capture 
not be affected by any of the problems mentioned above. This would ensure that the 
data collected was as pure as possible in order that the results obtained were totally 
reliable. In order to satisfy this requirement, a system for capturing the keystroke data 
with a single board computer was implemented. The software to acquire the keystroke 
data was written entirely in assembly language. With no operating system on the device 
and the complete control that low-level programming enables; a stable, clean 
environment was created for capturing keystroke dynamics. A keyboard was the only 
input device connected to the system, with a monitor connected for the output. This set- 
up contained no hard disk, so data was transferred via serial cable onto a host PC for 
analysis. The program listing can be found in Appendix A- Keystroke Capture 
Program. The processor for the data capture was the MotorolaTM MC68000. All 
experiments were programmed and conducted with the MatlabTM simulation package 
(Version 5.2 release R11). The metric used throughout the thesis to quantify the timing 
gaps between keystrokes is processor clock cycles, with each clock cycle representing a 
period of 0.125us. 
3.4 Measurable Keystroke Features 
The number of measurements which may be quantified from a keyboard as a 
person types, varies according to the type of keyboard. Possible measurements that may 
be useful include keystroke pressure and key acceleration. However, obtaining these 
measurements would require the use of a special keyboard. Such keyboards would 
impose a hardware cost on the provision of a keystroke recognition system. For this 
reason, the collection of data was implemented on a standard keyboard, where three key 
measurements can be captured: 
1. Keydown - this occurs when a key is depressed. 
2. Keyup - this occurs when a depressed key is released. 
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3. Keycode - the unique code which identifies which key was depressed/released 
From these three measurements, two metrics can be obtained: 
1. Flight time - the time between a keyup and a keydown. 
2. Hold time - the time between a keydown and a keyup. 
Not all methods use both of these metrics, some use just the hold or flight time. 
Others utilise the combined metric obtained from just adding the hold and flight times 
together. This gives the time interval from keydown to keydown (or keyup to keyup). 
[18] shows that the hold time is a better metric than the flight time for identifying 
individuals. Also, it is shown that using both the metrics as separate entities yields a 
better result than the combined metric. For example, the potential function method 
reported in [18] has FR and FA errors of 4.7% and 2.2% respectively for the case where 
just the flight time is used. The FA and FR reduce to 1.9% and 0.7% when both hold 
and flight time are used. 
The single board computer system used in this study to collect the raw keystroke 
data had the ability to record a `key-down' event only. Therefore, all the experimental 
data utilised the combined hold and flight time. The use of a consistent data set provided 
a good base from which to draw comparisons between different classification methods. 
3.5 Variance of Behaviour Over Time 
An unknown quantity with behavioural biometrics is the possibility that the 
behavioural trait will change over a period of time. There has been no evidence of this 
occurring within the current published research on keystroke dynamics. However, it is 
perhaps intuitive that it will be a problem among some users. This is also a problem 
with physical biometric features, for example, a cut on an individuals fingertip may 
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render their fingerprint unrecognisable. 
Keystroke behavioural traits differ from some physical metrics as they are less 
likely to experience sudden, acute changes (such as the scar on a fingertip). Changes in 
behaviour tend to occur slowly and over a period of time. In this way it is possible to 
update the classifier so that it `learns' and adapts to subtle changes in the users 
behaviour. This is a problem that will only require solving once a classification 
technique for a keystroke recognition system has been perfected. The scope of this 
thesis is primarily concerned with classification techniques. Therefore, changes in 
behaviour will not be covered within the context of this thesis. 
3.6 Data Sets 
When a person performs a task with a high frequency they develop a consistent 
behaviour. The same holds true in keystroke dynamics [1]. Two types of data were 
acquired in order to explore the differences in results when users type personally 
familiar phrases and general phrases. These two data sets are labelled biased and 
unbiased respectively. The combination of these two data sets provide a solid base from 
which to design and test the system. The unbiased data set was chosen in order to test 
the classifier's discrimination abilities and the biased to indicate likely performance in a 
real application. Each data set is divided into training and test samples. The number of 
training samples must be a realistic amount that a person would be willing to give in 
order to set-up a keystroke dynamic system. A figure of ten samples was chosen as this 
seemed acceptable to most users and is similar to amounts used in other experiments, 
notably [5]. The number of users in the unbiased data set was twenty one and the 
number in the biased set five. All the users were familiar with a computer keyboard and 
they also had varying degrees of typing ability. No mistakes were tolerated during the 
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capture of keystrokes. If a user made a typing error the sample was discarded and 
another attempt initiated. 
3.6.1 Unbiased Data 
The unbiased data set is used to test the classifiers ability to discriminate users 
based solely on their typing rhythm. As all users type the same universally known 
phrase, any variances and correlations emerging from the data will be purely attributed 
to their individual typing rhythms. Users have no prior knowledge or experience in 
typing this phrase, therefore, it is labelled unbiased. Some studies have used long strings 
of text in order to extract the keystroke dynamics. In this work the logon procedure is 
the focus, therefore, a phrase similar in length to the typical logon was used. Each user 
was requested to type the word `username' followed by a carriage return, the word 
`password' and a final carriage return. Timing was initiated as soon as the username 
prompt appeared and ended with the final carriage return. This resulted in a timing 
vector of 18 time intervals for each sample (Figure 3.1). Each of the twenty one users 
provided fifteen samples. These samples were later split into training and test sets, with 
ten samples in the training set and five in the test set. 
Whilst this provides a good test for any pattern recognition method, the results it 
produces will not be representative of the final application. In a keystroke dynamic 
logon system, users will type their own particular username in order to logon. This 
username will become very familiar to the correct user, but unfamiliar to an impostor. 
Therefore, to indicate the likely performance to be expected from the classifier in the 
real application, the biased data set was created. 
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Username Carriage 
Prompt Return 
> u_s_e_r n_a_m_e_+-' _p_a_s_s_w_o_r 
d_-1 
Time 
Interval 
Figure 3.1 Structure of time intervals for unbiased data 
3.6.2 Biased Data 
The biased data provides a more realistic test for a keystroke dynamic system. 
In the biased data set, users were asked to type a phrase which is particularly familiar to 
them. To emulate a login procedure, each user was asked to type their names in full. 
The timing started with the prompt for their name, followed by a carriage return, the 
word `password' and a final carriage return. Each user was then requested to provide 
attempts at typing the other user's names. This provided impostor samples for every 
user. The number of timing intervals generated in each sample for the extraction of the 
keystroke features varied with the length of the users name. The lowest number of 
timing intervals was 19 and the highest 25. Each of the five users provided twenty 
samples of their own name and ten `impostor' samples for the other four names. These 
samples were later split into training and test sets, with ten samples in the training set 
and ten in the test set. 
3.7 Dealing with outlier data 
Hesitations that occur during typing, often do so at random intervals [2]. These 
hesitations can have an effect on the performance of the classifier. This is particularly 
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important in the training of neural networks. In order for a neural network to learn a 
pattern correctly, it relies on the data within the samples being representative of the 
class. Any data which are not consistent with a pattern will cause a network to learn an 
erroneous pattern. It is therefore important that the data being supplied to the neural 
network are as `clean' as possible. 
Typical Outlier Data for One User - Unbiased Data 
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Figure 3.2 Typical Outlier Datum 
An illustration of how spurious outlier data can affect the sample space can be 
seen in Figure 3.2. The three dimensional plot shows the typing samples for one user 
from the unbiased data set. Sixteen time intervals in each sample can be seen on the axis 
labelled `time intervals' (the first and last samples are removed due to high variance). 
Fifteen samples are then arranged along the axis labelled `samples'. The time for a 
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keystroke is represented on the `keystroke latency' axis - note the unit of measurement 
here is processor clock cycles. The large values (x105) gives some idea of the high 
resolution obtained in this experimental environment. 
A visual comparison can be made with the keystroke patterns along the 
`samples' axis. Each sample is of a similar pattern, creating an almost uniform 
landscape along that `samples' axis, with the exception of two prominent `spikes' in 
samples 2 and 13. These two points can be considered outlier data. They are clearly not 
consistent with the remainder of the samples, although they both appear within the same 
typing interval, which suggests that the user has a particular problem with hesitations at 
that point in the login string. The presence of these spikes will cause problems with the 
training of the neural networks and also with the vector distance functions. 
3.8 Data Pre-processing 
In order to reduce errors, the effect on classification that an outlier datum point 
has within a sample needs to be suppressed. There are many methods which have been 
developed in order to solve similar problems in other applications. A well known 
o. statistical technique is the z-scores test (3.1) where: x; = current value, x= mean, 2= 
standard deviation. 
x; -x Zi - 
62 
(3.1) 
When a user enrols on a keystroke dynamics system they provide a set of 
samples as a reference for the classifier. Those samples are used in order to create a 
reference template. From this reference template the mean value for each observed time 
interval is calculated. The z-score for each time interval is calculated by subtracting the 
mean value of that time interval from the current value, then dividing it by the standard 
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deviation for that interval. So in addition to the reference template mean, we also need 
the standard deviation for each keystroke in the vector. This effectively doubles the 
amount of data needing to be stored for each user in a simple statistical classifier. 
However, the z-score allows the identification of any points in the training and test sets 
which fall outside a certain deviation from the reference template. Once these outlier 
points have been identified, their effects need to be minimised. One method for 
achieving this is to replace the outlier value with a value more representative of the 
sample. This can be achieved by simply replacing the errant value with the equivalent 
from the template. However, an impostor's typing rhythm may produce many time 
intervals which are unrepresentative of the correct user's response. These would then be 
wrongly identified as outlier points. In order to reduce this effect a limit needs to be 
placed on the number of outlier points that can be replaced within any given sample. 
Also, by replacing the errant value with one from the template, the distance between the 
vectors would be reduced by an amount which would not normally occur as it is very 
rare that a time interval will be an exact match to that of the template. This is the 
method which is used in the subsequent chapters. 
Another method would to be to apply a scaling factor to the outlier value to 
reduce its effects. This would enable the value to be reduced to a level which is closer 
to, but not the same as the value in the template. It must be noted that this will also need 
a limit applying to stop every single value being brought more towards that of the 
correct user. Employing these techniques has the effect of reducing the false rejection 
error, but their nature of altering the uniqueness of impostor data will increase the false 
acceptance error. The degree to which the false acceptance and false rejection errors are 
affected depends on the number of outlier points which are altered. 
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3.9 Feature Extraction 
The first step in most pattern recognition tasks is to extract some quantifiable 
features from the given data. The features extracted directly influence the performance 
of the classifier. Ideally, the set of features extracted should provide the classifier with 
easily (linearly) separable clusters within the pattern space. Often, improvements in the 
performance of pattern recognition systems are due to improvements in the extraction of 
features and not the design of a better classifier. Extracting the right features from a data 
set can reduce the computational complexity of the problem. In applications where the 
observations acquired contain significant amounts of data, such as image recognition, 
feature extraction is essential to obtain the important artefacts from the mass of data. 
In keystroke dynamics, especially applied to login monitoring, the amount of 
data acquired is low compared with other pattern recognition tasks such as image 
recognition. In this case, the task of any feature extraction will not primarily be feature 
reduction, but the elimination of erroneous data from the sample. When looking at the 
standard deviation of a typical user's typing behaviour (Figure 3.3), it is clear to see that 
some of the keystroke intervals occur with more consistency than others. One possible 
method is to apply more weighting on these intervals, so that the classifier places more 
importance on the intervals which have a low variance. However, if any outlier datum 
occurs on these points, it will have a greatly exaggerated effect due to the higher 
weighting. This weighted method shows promise, however, an exploration of this was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is clear to see from Figure 3.3 that the first sample has a very large variance. 
This sample is the time interval between the prompt appearing on the screen and the 
user pressing the first key (u). As can be expected, the variance is large as the user takes 
varying levels of time to start typing based on their reaction to the prompt and the 
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distance that their finger needs to move to start typing on the keyboard. This feature is 
inconsistent and displays a high variance in all users, so it was removed from the data of 
every user before classification. 
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3.10 Summary 
Standard Deviation of User 3 Unbiased Data 
Figure 3.3 Standard Deviation of User 3 for Unbiased Data 
This chapter has introduced the problems associated with the accurate capturing 
of keystrokes on a computer keyboard. The task of timing the keystroke intervals has 
been addressed and an experimental environment described. The measurable features of 
keystrokes have been listed along with some typical behaviour traits of keystroke 
dynamics. The problems that outlier data can cause have been discussed and a method 
to reduce their effect introduced. 
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Chapter 4 
Statistical Techniques 
4.1 Introduction 
Many of the keystroke dynamic methods use simple statistical techniques to 
classify keystroke rhythms [1,2,4,9]. From these, more complicated statistically based 
methods have evolved [3,5,6,7,8] - notably BiopasswordTM. The use of statistical 
methods has certain advantages: 
" They are proven techniques, used in many applications over a long 
period of time. 
9 The behaviour of statistical classifiers can be predicted. 
This enables probabilities of outcomes, thresholds and limits to be accurately 
measured. . This is especially important in security applications, as the integrity of the 
system to intrusion must be known. 
The vector distance measure is a fundamental tool in the field of pattern 
recognition. Proving particularly useful where data is consistently similar within groups 
and dissimilar across groups. As a starting point in this pattern recognition task, an 
investigation was performed to see how well simple distance functions could 
discriminate individual typing profiles. Two popular distance functions were 
implemented, the Euclidean and Manhattan (or City Block). These methods are used as 
a benchmark with which to compare results achieved with neural networks in the other 
chapters. 
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4.2 Euclidean Distance 
The first method to be considered was based on the Euclidean distance (4.1) 
where, x; = current vector of time samples of length i and y; = reference vector of time 
samples of length i. This measure was selected as it is widely used in the field of pattern 
recognition. Samples from individuals were divided into two sets -a set used as a 
reference template and a set used for testing. The reference template was constructed as 
a mean prototype. A mean prototype refers to a class which is described by one point in 
the pattern space (usually the mean). Five of the samples from each user were averaged 
to produce a mean vector for each user. 
d_ Y2 (xi _yi)z (4.1) 
This mean vector was then used to determine whether a test sample belonged to 
the individual or not. The Euclidean distance was computed between the test sample and 
the reference sample. If this distance was below a threshold value the sample was 
deemed to originate from the correct individual. Any samples which were over this 
threshold level were deemed to be from an impostor. Changing the level of this 
threshold will affect the behaviour of the verifier. A higher threshold will reduce the 
chance of the correct user being rejected, but increase the chance of an impostor being 
accepted. These two errors are False Rejection (FR - Type 1) and False Acceptance (FA 
- Type 2). There will be an optimum threshold level where both these errors are 
minimised, as described in section 2.5 - Evaluating Perfonnance. This threshold level 
depends on the consistency of samples produced by the individual. Reviewing the 
response from each user would be too time consuming and unnecessary as most fit into 
three distinct categories: high error, average error and low error. In the following 
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sections these categories relate to the optimum levels for FA/FR errors for each user. 
4.2.1 Unbiased Data 
Firstly the method was implemented with the unbiased data set. 
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Figure 4.1 Average error User Error Curve Unbiased 
The graph in Figure 4.1 shows the typical error curves associated with an 
average error user. This is the response which the majority of users in the data set 
generate. Figure 4.2 shows a high error response for a user with an inconsistent typing 
style. There are two users who display this behaviour. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the case 
for a consistent typist with a low error response from the verifier. Again there are only 
two users who fall into this category. 
This highlights the fact that the performance in the level of security provided by 
keystroke dynamics is affected by the uniqueness and consistency of the typist. There 
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exists a large difference in the optimum FA and FR rate of nearly 60% between the best 
and worst users, 21 and 17. 
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Figure 4.2 High error User Error Curve Unbiased 
From Figure 4.4 each users optimum threshold errors for FA and FR can be seen 
plotted against that threshold level. Here the optimum errors for FA and FR shown in 
Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 are plotted against their relative threshold levels. 
This is also done for all the other users in the data set. A high concentration of optimum 
values for FA and FR can be seen around the average error and threshold. It is a general 
rule that the larger the threshold level, the more inconsistent the user is. This can be 
seen as the lowest and highest error points also correspond to the lowest and highest 
threshold levels. Most users are around the average errors for FR (29.5238%) and FA 
(31.5476%) (Table 1). 
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4.2.2 Biased Data 
Applying the biased data to this method yields slightly better results. All of the 
users exhibit a lower threshold level - indicating that they are more consistent when 
typing this type of data. Average error errors are slightly lower than for the unbiased 
data set with FR (25.3333%) and FA (27%). 
Figure 4.5 shows the response of the average error user, with a high error user 
and low error user response shown by Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 respectively. Figure 4.8 
shows the results of the optimum threshold level for all the users in the sample set. 
Here, the threshold level averages are lower than the unbiased set. By comparing Figure 
4.8 with Figure 4.4 the reduction in average threshold is from almost 1.25 x105 to 
0.5xlO 5. This suggests a more consistent typing style. The average errors have also 
reduced considerably from FR and FAs of 0.3 and 0.32 in Table I to an FR of 0.12 and 
an FA of 0.09 in Table 2. 
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Figure 4.4 Optimum Threshold Error Levels Across Users Unbiased 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.22 
0.30 
0.33 
0.50 
0.50 
0.20 
0.20 
0.40 
0.40 
0.10 
0.15 
0.30 
0.33 
0.30 
0.34 
0.30 
0.33 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 
FR 
FA 
0.40 
0.40 
0.30 
0.30 
0.20 
0.27 
0.20 
0.29 
0.40 
0.41 
0.20 
0.20 
0.60 
0.60 
0.30 
0.30 
0.50 
0.50 
0.30 
0.34 0.0 
Table I- Table of results for Euclidean Distance Unbiased 
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Figure 4.7 Low error User Error Curve Biased Data 
70 
60 
50 
40 
w 
m 
J30 
20 
56 
x 10 
+ Type 1- FR 
+ Type 2- FA 
Average FA 
Average FR 
10 
Average Threshold 
I 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
Threshold Level 
x 10 
5 
oý 0 
Figure 4.8 Optimum Threshold Error Levels Across Users Biased 
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User Y 2 3 4 5 Mean 
FR 
FA 
0.13 
0.08 
0.20 
0 
0.20 
0.18 
0.40 
0.05 
0.33 
0.15 
0.12 
0.09 
Table 2- Table of Results for Euclidean Distance Biased 
4.3 Manhattan Distance 
The same approach from above was implemented with the Manhattan distance 
in place of the Euclidean. The Manhattan (or city block) distance (4.2) is similar to the 
Euclidean distance but omits the square term. 
d= x, - yil 
4.3.1 Unbiased data 
(4.2) 
We can see the response obtained by using the Manhattan distance in the 
unbiased user's data is slightly better than that obtained with the Euclidean distance. 
The plots again show the results for an average error, high error and low error user 
(Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 respectively). Average error errors are FR 
(21.34%) and FA (23-48%). 
Again, all the optimum FA and FR levels are displayed in Table 3. The average 
FA and FR are lower by 0.08 in both cases compared with Table 1. 
4.3.2 Biased data 
Applying the biased data to this method results again in an improvement over 
the unbiased data with average error errors of FR (17.33%) and FA (19.00%). It can be 
seen in the figures for low error, high error and average error user that there is a general 
improvement over the Euclidean distance method. 
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Figure 4.10 Bad User Error Curve Unbiased Data 
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Figure 4.12 Optimum Threshold Error Levels Across Users Unbiased 
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User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA 
0 
0.01 
0.10 
0.10 
0.20 
0.20 
0.30 
0.30 
0.20 
0.25 
0.40 
0.43 
0.10 
0.15 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0 
0.06 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 
FR 
FA 
0.20 
0.20 
0.10 
0.12 
0.30 
0.30 
0.20 
0.20 
0.40 
0.40 
0.20 
0.20 
0.50 
0.53 
0.20 
0.27 
0.30 
0.33 
0.40 0 
0.42 0 
Table 3- Table of results for Manhattan Distance Unbiased Data 
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Figure 4.15 Manhattan high error user biased data 
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Figure 4.16 Manhattan optimum threshold error levels across users for biased data 
User 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
FR 
FA 
0.13 
0.15 
0.07 
0.08 
0.20 
0.20 
0.27 
0.33 
0.20 
0.20 
0.17 
0.19 
Table 4- Table of results for Manhattan Distance Biased Data 
4.4 Discussion 
We have seen that there is a performance gain in using the Manhattan distance 
as opposed to the Euclidean distance. To understand why there is an improvement, the 
nature of the patterns generated by keystroke dynamics need to be analysed. We have 
seen from section 3.7 that keystroke patterns exhibit a degree of variance between 
samples. This is generally true of many behavioural biometrics, as behaviour is a more 
fluid trait to capture compared to the solid, almost invariant physical biometrics such as 
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iris patterns. In particular, when a person is typing they often tend to pause or hesitate, 
interrupting the flow of their typing. This can occur whilst the brain is engaged in 
contemplating the next course of action to take, or is momentarily distracted. As many 
factors contribute to these distracting moments, hesitations tend to occur in a random 
fashion. The effects of these hesitations will create a keystroke interval within a sample 
which is uncharacteristic of the interval stored in the template. The Euclidean distance 
contains a square tenn which can exaggerate a large difference between a keystroke 
interval and completely eclipse all other intervals in the sample. The effect that this 
outlier datum point has on the Manhattan distance is reduced as it contains no square 
term. By using the Manhattan distance instead of the Euclidean distance, the area within 
which a sample could be classified as the correct user is increased, leading to the 
possibility that more impostors could be accepted by the classifier and hence an increase 
in the false acceptance error. To combat this problem, other means for dealing with 
outlier data are required, such as the z-score [25] pre-processing described in section 
3.8. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a popular statistical approach to pattern recognition of keystroke 
dynamics has been implemented. The results show the varying degrees of performance 
that individual users exhibit. The difference in results for the two distance measures of 
Euclidean and Manhattan distance has been shown. This difference in perfonnance has 
been linked to the squared term in the Euclidean distance measure inflating the effects 
of outlier datum points due to user hesitation whilst typing. The dependence of errors 
that exists in biometric systems between FA and FR has been illustrated. 
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Chapter 5 
Backpropagation Neural Network 
5.1 Introduction 
The backpropagation neural network (BPNN) [26] is a well seasoned network 
which has been successfully applied to many pattern recognition problems [27). It 
typically consists of a feed forward network with an input layer, an output layer and at 
least one hidden layer. The backpropagation gradient descent technique [27] is then 
applied to train the network's weights in a supervised mode in order to minimise the 
error with the output node targets. 
The BPNN has the ability to solve complex problems with compact network 
structures [27]. However, its learning process is often unpredictable, time consuming 
and can become stuck in a solution that is not optimal [27]. Network design is done on a 
trial-and-error basis as there are many factors which can be fine-tuned to improve the 
network's performance. This provides additional. attributes which cannot be optimally 
set during enrolment. The behaviour of the network is also not totally predictable which 
has proved unacceptable in mission critical applications and is a problem when 
establishing the levels of security provided [28]. 
5.2 Identiflcation and BPNN 
The backpropagation algorithm, while suffering from well documented 
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problems can, under the right conditions, perform as a highly efficient non-linear 
classifier [27]. It is therefore useful to implement an identification problem and observe 
how the BPNN performs. In this experiment, the BPNN was trained to identify a user 
out of the group of twenty-one using the unbiased data. In the unbiased data set, all 
users are typing the same phrase; therefore, any resulting differences across users (and 
similarities with users) will be due entirely to their typing rhythms. The degree to which 
the BPNN is able to classify these samples will indicate the level of individuality which 
exists across users. For this experiment the BPNN was set up as follows: 
The training data set contained two thirds of the samples from each user. The 
test data set containing the remaining third of samples. Input data were normalised 
between -1 and 1. The BPNN architecture contained 16 input nodes, 21 hidden nodes, 
and 21 output nodes. The transfer function for the hidden layer was the 'tansig' 
squashing function [29]. This was chosen as the tansig function range is the same as that 
of the inputs. The number of nodes in the hidden layer were chosen to represent the 
twenty one different typing styles. The output transfer function was the 'logsig' function 
[29]. This was chosen as its range matches that of the output nodes. The target vector 
applied to the outputs was set to a one on the node corresponding with the user and a 
zero on all other nodes. Training was carried out with the resilient backpropagation 
method [29]. The resilient backpropagation method trains quickly and is not affected by 
the small changes that occur at the limit of sigmoid squashing functions as the direction 
of training is based on only the sign of the gradient, not the magnitude. This training 
method also has the advantage of fewer variables to set and is not sensitive to learning 
rate changes like some other methods. 
The results of training for 2334 epochs give a correct classification of 92.4% of 
samples for the training data and 89.5% for the test data. These results were achieved 
after several attempts, as a good starting point provided by the random initialisation of 
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weights and biases is required for successful training. However, the network never 
failed to reach a minimum on other occasions and results for the test data were generally 
above 60%. This result shows that the neural network is clearly able to partition the 
pattern space into regions unique to each user. The response of the network with the test 
data is generally correct and of a high activation, this can be seen in Figure 5.1. r-I 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Figure 5.1 Correct classification 
i 
The line plot shows the activation on each of the output nodes. The bar shows 
the target user. A green plot shows the highest activation node on the output correctly 
corresponds to the target user. However, the network can also produce an error with a 
high activation as seen in Figure 5.2. This shows it is important to note that a high 
activation does not indicate a high degree of confidence in the decision of the network 
as it may in some statistical methods. 
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Testing Data: User 8 Sample 4 (88/106) 
Figure 5.2 Incorrect Classification 
Here the plot is coloured red as the highest activation is on node 18 whereas the 
target user is 8. A few responses show activations on more than one node. In this case, 
the sample provided by the user is confused with other users (Figure 5.3). 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 - 
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0.3 
0.2 
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01 
0 
Testing Data: User 4 Sample 2 (70/105) 
Figure 5.3 Correct classification with Other Activation 
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Although the target user has been correctly identified as user 4, users I and 5 
also exhibit a high node activation. The reasons for this may be found by analysing the z: 1 
raw keystroke dynamic data. This data can be seen in (Figure 5.4) 
x 10 5 
I tj 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
n ') 
Al 
10 12 14 16 
Figure 5.4 Uncharacteristic Datum 
The blue line represents the sample that is causing the multiple activations on 
the output nodes. The red lines represent the other samples, which do not cause any 
problems for the network and are all classified with a high activation. It can be seen that 
in this particular sample there are three time intervals (intervals 3,7 and 14) which are 
uncharacteristic of the rest of the samples. These uncharacteristic delays are possibly the 
reason why there is a high activation with users 5 and 1, as these larger values may push 
the samples point in pattern space towards the regions for these two users. 
5.3 Verification and BPNN 
The BPNN, after producing results for identification, was applied to the 
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verification problem. In this scenario the number of classes which the network must 
separate is reduced from twenty one to two. This equates to a mapping of hyperspace 
which is less complex. The network must generalise to an area of high activation in the 
region of hyperspace consistent with the correct user and respond with a low activation 
in all other regions of hyperspace. The network requires training for each of the users in 
the data set. 
The training data set contained two thirds of the samples from each user. The 
test data set contained the remaining third of samples. Input data was normalised 
between -1 and 1. The BPNN architecture contained 16 input nodes, 3 hidden nodes, 
and 2 output nodes. The number of hidden nodes was chosen as three because this 
yielded the most consistent results during trials. The transfer function for the hidden 
layer was the 'tansig' squashing function. This was chosen as the tansig function range 
is the same as that of the inputs. The output transfer function was the 'logsig' function. 
This was chosen as its range matches that of the output nodes. The target vector applied 
to the outputs was set to a one on the first node and a zero on the second node if the 
sample corresponded with the correct user. If the sample did not correspond with the 
correct user then a zero was applied to the first node and a one on the second node. 
Training was carried out with the resilient backpropagation method [29]. 
5.3.1 Unbiased Data 
The BPNN was trained on the unbiased data with the training regime set to 
minimise the false rejection error on the training data set. This enables the BPNN to 
generalise well for the correct user whilst keeping the false acceptance to a minimum. 
The behaviour of the network for each user can be more adequately compared, as the 
FR is minimised in all cases. The network's response to the training data shows that the 
resilient backpropagation algorithm is able to map the inputs to the respective targets 
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with minimal error. The only exception was user 20, where the network fails to train 
adequately. 
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Figure 5.5 Results for Unbiased Training Data on BPNN 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
FR 
FA 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0.02 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.30 0 
0.03 0 
Table 5- Table of results for Unbiased Training Data on BPNN 
The network was then simulated on the previously unseen test data set. As 
expected the errors are higher on the more demanding test set. Ten users exhibit errors 
for FA and FR in the region of 0- 10%, the remainder being around 20% apart from two 
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with FR errors of around 40% and 60%. These two errors are relatively high, howevei-, 
the corresponding FA errors are low. This shows that while the correct user has been 
rejected by the system, very few impostors were able to gain access. In the case of user 
4 no impostors were falsely accepted. 
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Figure 5.6 Results for Unbiased Test Data on BPNN 
Applying pre-processed data to the BPNN it can be seen in (Figure 5.7) that the 
network trains to an acceptable level, which is slightly improved over the non pre- 
processed data. Users 19 and 20 still prove difficult for the network to adapt to, but 
there is a reduction in both FA and FR for these users under training. 
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User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0 
0.10 
0 
0.06 
0 
0.02 
0.60 
0 
0 
0.06 
0.20 
0 
0 
0.02 
0 
0 
0.20 
0 
0 
0.19 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Mean 
FR 
FA 
0 
0.02 
0 
0 
0 
0.04 
0.20 
0.01 
0 
0.14 
0.20 
0.01 
0 
0.22 
0 
0.19 
0 
0.17 
0.40 0.20 
0.07 0.01 
0.10 
0.061 
Table 6- Table of Results for Unbiased Test Data on BPNN 
BPNN Verification Training Data with PIP 
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Figure 5.7 Results for Unbiased Training Data for BPNN with Pre-Processing 
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Figure 3.8 Results for Unbiased Test Data for BPNN with Pre-Processing 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA 
0.18 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
OAX) 
0.09 
0.20 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.08 
0.60 
0.00 
0.40 
User It 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Meaý 
FR 
FA 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.43 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
0.02 
0.40 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.08 
0.13 
Table 7- Table of Results for Unbiased Test Data for BPNN with Pre-Processing 
The test data set with pre-processing shows a mixed picture. Some users 
experience a dramatic reduction in error, notably user 20, whilst others endure a rise in 
error for both FA and FR. Overall, the FR error is slightly reduced and the FA error 
slightly increased. This variation in the errors reported is possibly due to the BPNN 
learning inappropriately or over fitting some users. 
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5.3.2 Biased Data 
The biased data shows results which are much improved over the unbiased data 
set. For training, every user attained zero error. As expected, the errors on both FA and 
FR are much reduced in the test set (Figure 5.9). Only user 3 is error free, but the 
network has generalised well for all other users. User 5 has the greatest error with 20% 
FA and FR. 
. 42 
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Figure 5.9 Results for Biased Test Data for BPNN 
Table 8- Table of results for BPNN biased no PP 
User 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0.10 
0 
0 
0.10 
0 
0 
0 
0.10 
0.20 
0.20 
0.06 
0.08 
34 
User 
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter the BPNN, a traditional method for non-linear pattern recognition 
tasks, has been applied to keystroke dynamic data. The network was trained in 
identification mode to demonstrate the level of separation amongst users that raw 
keystroke dynamic data can provide. The BPNN was evaluated in a verification role 
with the two sets of data and pre-processing. We can see from these results that it is 
clearly possible to partition pattern space to classify users on their keystroke behaviour 
using the BPNN. The first implementation of the BPNN in an identification role 
achieves this partitioning with a high degree of accuracy for almost 90% of the test set. 
The BPNN also performed well in an verification role with errors which are much 
reduced compared to the statistical average FR and FA of 10% and 6% for the unbiased 
data. However, the BPNN required training over several thousand epochs and in most 
cases this training was repeated several times before the random weight initialisations 
were at values enabling the network to find a global minimum. 
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Chapter 6 
Probabilistic Neural Network 
6.1 Introduction 
The BPNN has been shown to posses the ability to map decision boundaries 
around keystroke dynamic data. However, the BPNN suffers from well known problems 
during training such as getting stuck in local minima. Also, the many parameters that 
the BPNN is dependant on, and highly sensitive to, such as number of hidden 
layers/nodes and their associated transfer functions and learning rates cannot be set 
analytically. Optimising the BPNN becomes a case of trial and error. The structure of 
the BPNN requires that training is carried out on the whole of the data set when data is 
added or removed. This could be time consuming in a keystroke dynamic verification 
system when a user needs to enrol or leave. In order to address these problems a neural 
network was sought that might be more applicable to keystroke dynamics. 
The PNN classifier is an effective tool in pattern recognition as it has evolved 
from well established Bayesian statistical techniques [23]. It is closely related to radial- 
basis function neural networks [23]. The following advantages when compared to 
backpropagation make it a more suitable candidate for keystroke dynamics: 
4o Rapid Training: The PNN can train much faster than the BPNN [23]. It merely needs 
to 'read'the data. 
o The PNN is guaranteed to converge to an optimal result given sufficient data [23). 
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This contrasts with the unpredictable nature of the BPNN which suffers from the 
problem of local minima. 
e Data can be added and deleted without re-training. Useful for adding new users to the 
system and removing old ones. 
* The PNN gives a measure of confidence associated with an output, as the output 
node values are a combination of the similarity measures from the middle layer [23]. 
However, the network produced by the PNN contains many more nodes and is 
computationally more intensive than the BPNN, a fact that is offset somewhat by its 
parallel nature [23]. Due to the parallel nature of the PNN, it is a candidate for multi- 
processor systems. The PNN still retains many of the features associated with BPNN 
such as learning and generalisation, but these are performed in a more stable and 
predictable manner. 
Distribution Layer 
Pattern Layer 
ZBQ 
Summation Layer 
Decision Layer 
Figure 6.1 Structure of PNN 
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The structure of the PNN for a2 class problem can be seen in Figure 6.1 [23]. It 
consists of 4 layers: 
1. The Distribution Layer: This performs no computation and just connects the inputs 
to the next layer. The inputs to the neural network [XI -ý XNI were mapped to the 
time intervals for each person's sample. For example, in the unbiased data set the 
time interval between u&s in the phrase 'username' was mapped to XI, the interval 
between s&e to X2, etc... Hence, the number of nodes (16) in the distribution layer 
represents the number of time intervals in the input vector. 
2. The Pattern Layer: A node is created in the pattern layer for each training sample. 
The inputs are passed through the nodes weights (AF/BF) where A and B represent 
weights generated by each class during training. This is then passes through a 
Gaussian function FO. This gaussian function is centred around zero, outputting a 
one if the input to it is zero. This provides the node with a higher activation for input 
patterns that have a small vector distance with the nodes weights. 
3. The Summation Layer: The outputs of each pattern layer node are summed. 
4. The Decision Layer: This picks the largest node in the summation layer, outputting a 
I for S,, > SB and a0 otherwise. 
Problems with more than 2 classes are easily dealt with by a competitive 
algorithm in the decision layer to pick the summation node with the highest value. 
The outputs of the pattern layer nodes, are given by: 
Zci = exp[(X' * 
XRi - 1) /47 
21 
(li. 1) 
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The outputs of the summation layer nodes, are given by: 
p 
Sc = Eexp[(X'* XRi 
1=1 
Where the subscript c indicates the class to which the node belongs (for 
example, in the two class problem in Figure 6.1, c would indicate a node belonging to 
either class A or class B). The subscript i identifies the training sample associated with 
the node in the pattern layer. The value P represents the number of nodes for each class 
in the pattern layer, cy 2 being the standard deviation. The transpose of the unknown 
vector to classify is V and the weights are XRi (R denoting that the vector is a 
'reference' or 'training' vector, i representing the training sample associated with the 
node). The network operates by calculating the dot product between the unknown vector 
and the training vectors. However, this uses normalised training and testing vectors. 
Normalisation of data for this problem results in loss of information concerning the total 
typing duration [131. In order to overcome the problem with normalisation, the dot 
product term may be replaced by a distance measure. Two distance measures which can 
be applied to this problem are the Euclidean Distance and the Manhattan Distance. 
These have already been described in chapter 4, however, their performance within the 
PNN is not known so an evaluation of their application to the PNN is required. 
Whilst the PNN does not suffer from the trial and error approach needed for 
BPNNs one important variable needs to be set. The spread function determines the 
extent to which the network will generalise. A good description of this behaviour may 
be found in [23], where the effects of applying small, medium, and large spread 
constants on the generalisation of the network are explored. Although it is difficult to 
determine this spread constant objectively, its effect on results is not nearly as acute as 
the parameters for the BPNN. At the limit, an extremely small spread function will 
make the PNN behave as a 'nearest-neighbour' classifier. An extremely large spread 
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function will create many overlapping boundaries and result in misclassifications. The 
spread value was set to an empirically derived value which gave consistently good 
results under experimentation. 
6.2 Verification and PNN 
6.2.1 Unbiased Data 
Results for the PNN during training produced zero FA and FR effors. Therefore, 
only results obtained from the training set will be examined. The first implementation of 
the PNN used the Euclidean distance function with no data pre-processing. It can be 
seen from Figure 6.2 that the FR error rate is fairly high and user 19 has completely 
failed to be accepted by the system. However, FA rates are low, in some cases zero. The 
sensitivity of the Euclidean distance metric to the outlier data within the samples is the 
main contributor to the high false acceptance error. Consistent users, such as user 21, 
perform fairly well, but inconsistent users perform badly with this set-up. 
Performance for the FR error is improved when the data is pre-processed before 
being submitted to the PNN as can be seen in Figure 6.3. There is a trade off, however, 
as the FA rate has increased due to the pre-processing. User 19 is now accepted by the 
system on two occasions, lowering the previous FR error from 100% to 60%. This is 
still a considerable error, even on this difficult set of data. 
Applying the PNN using the Manhattan distance function and no pre-processing 
Figure 6.4 it is clear to see there is a higher FR error evident than that occurring in the 
BPNN case Figure 5.6. The FA error with the BPNN is considerably higher for users 4 
and 20, this may be due to the BPNN's tendency to over generalise to accommodate a 
user exhibiting an inconsistent typing style. The PNN has the ability to generalise, but 
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in a more controlled manner than that of the BPNN, therefore it is less likely to respond 
to an inconsistent user with a high FA error. 
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Figure 6.2 Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Euclidean Distance 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0.60 
0.05 
0.20 
0.03 
0.20 
0.00 
0.80 
0.00 
0.40 
0.05 
0.80 
0.00 
0.20 
0.02 
0.40 
0.01 
0.20 
0.04 
0.40 
0.00 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
FR 
FA 
0.60 
0.02 
0.20 
OAX) 
0.20 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.60 
0.00 
0.60 
0.02 
0.80 
0.01 
0.20 
0.02 
1.00 
0.00 
0.80 
0.00 
Table 9- Table of Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Euclidean Distance 
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Figure 6.3 Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Euclidean Distance with Pre- 
Processing 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0.40 
0.09 
0.00 
0.03 
0.20 
0.00 
0.40 
0.06 
0.00 
0.37 
0.80 
0.05 
0.40 
0.17 
0.40 
0.02 
0.20 
0.14 
0.00 
0.02 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Meal 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0.40 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.40 
0.04 
0.00 
0.11 
0.60 
0.06 
0.80 
0.09 
0.80 
0.05 
0.20 
0.05 
0.60 
0.06 
0.60 
0.08 
0.00 
0.01 
0.3 
0.081 
Table 10 - Table of Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Euclidean Distance with Pre- 
Processing 
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Figure 6.4 Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Manhattan Distance 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA 
0.40 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
OAX) 
0.40 
0.00 
0.20 
0.04 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.20 
0.00 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Meaý 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0.20 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.02 
0.20 
0.00 
0.40 
0.03 
0.40 
0.01 
0.80 
0.01 
0.20 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.01 
Table II- Table of Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Manhattan Distance 
Pre-processing the data before submission to the PNN with the Manhattan 
distance function leads to an overall reduction in FIR error except for users 6 and 17. An 
overall increase in FA is observed as expected with the pre-processing. 
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Figure 6.5 Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Manhattan Distance with Pre- 
Processing 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA 
0.40 
0.08 
0A) 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.09 
0.00 
0.35 
0.80 
0.00 
0.20 
0.13 
0.40 
0.06 
0.00 
0.21 
0.00 
0.03 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Mean 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.02 
0.20 
0.04 
0.00 
0.11 
0.20 
0.05 
0.20 
0.09 
0.80 
0.07 
0.00 
0.06 
0.20 
0.07 
0.40 
0.11 
0.00 
0.02 
0.20 
0.08 
Table 12 - Table of Results for Unbiased Test Data for PNN using Manhattan Distance with Pre- 
Processing 
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6.2.2 Biased Data 
The PNN was able to fit the training data with zero error in all cases, therefore, 
only the test data results will be shown. 
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Figure 6.6 Results for Biased Test Data for PNN using Euclidean Distance 
User 12 3 4 5 Mean 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
10 0.00 
0.15 0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.10 
0.05 
0.08 
0.081 
Table 13 - Table of Results for Biased Test Data for PNN using Euclidean Distance 
Again the biased data set generates better results than the unbiased. Here the 
results for the PNN operating with the Euclidean distance function can be seen in Figure 
6.6. User 2 generates no errors, whilst errors across the other users are consistently low. 
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The results for the Manhattan Distance function are an improvement over the 
Euclidean Distance. It can be seen in Figure 6.7 that FR errors are zero for all users. The 
only errors occurring are a small 5% FA rate with users 4 and 5. This clearly shows the 
improvement in performance which is gained by using data which is biased towards a 
known user and the suitability of the PNN to this task. 
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Figure 6.7 Results for Biased Test Data for PNN using Manhattan Distance 
User 12 3 4 5 Mean 
FR (%) 
FA (%) 
OAT 000 
OJX) 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.02 
Table 14 - Table of Results for Biased Test Data 
for PNN using Manhattan Distance 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter the PNN has been shown to be an effective tool in the verification 
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of users using keystroke dynamics. The performance has been demonstrated with the 
use of data pre-processing to reduce the FR error rate. The PNN has shown an 
improvement in performance with the Manhattan Distance function over the Euclidean 
Distance function. 
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Chapter 7 
Cascade Forward Neural Network 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous pattern recognition techniques (Statistical, PNN and BPNN) work 
by comparing each time interval as a separate entity with its counterpart in the training 
data. Such that, if all the time intervals in the data set correspond to the correct typing 
intervals, the order in which they are presented to the classifier does not matter. A novel 
approach to the classification of keystroke dynamics is to consider the time intervals 
generated during acquisition as a sequence. As the depression of keys occurs 
successively, they can be viewed as sequenced events. Therefore, following 
measurements can be expected to be highly correlated with each other. This approach 
has the benefit of considering any additional information present in the order of the 
samples as well as the actual time intervals. However, this approach requires the use of 
dynamic neural networks, which can be considerably more difficult to analyse, model, 
implement and fine-tune than their static counterparts. 
Dynamic networks are more complex to model due to their recurrent topologies 
[29]. The structure of these networks incorporates feedback. This feedback can come 
from the output of the system, or the output of any number of intermediate nodes, and is 
fed back to the input or internal nodes. In this way, the present input to the system is 
affected by the previous system inputs. This gives the system a form of memory. Static 
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systems can also be said to possess a form of memory, but there are differences between 
this memorizing behaviour in static and dynamic systems. These differences are 
distinguished as long-term and short-term memory. Static networks are said to contain 
long-term memory as they have a repository of past inf6rmation. However, when this 
information is stored in the network weights, the knowledge of the time when the 
information was acquired is lost. Static networks are therefore unable to differentiate the 
relationships of time that might be present in data, as all information is compressed 
together in the network weights. Dynamic networks are said to contain short-term 
memory. This is due to the recurrent connections allowing the recording of timing 
information, so the network becomes sensitive to the order in which the information is 
presented. Dynamic networks also have a long-term memory which is stored in the 
connecting node weights but, unlike static networks, these weights record differences 
within the time window of observation applied to the data. 
There are many different types of dynamic neural network [28]. This study 
concentrates on a network architecture that is a variant of the BPNN, the Cascade 
Forward Neural Network (CFNN) [28]. A Cascade Forward Neural Network is identical 
to a feed-forward BPNN except that each layer after the first has weights coming not 
just from the previous layer but also from all other previous layers. We used the 
Levenberg-Marquardt [291 training algorithm to accelerate training in this case. The 
input to the network was generated by sliding a window over the time interval data, 
removing the window's central element at each step. The central element that was 
removed from the window was then used as the training target for the networks single 
output. The network is only trained on the data from the correct user, with the 
hypothesis that any subsequent unseen data from this user will exhibit similar 
correlations and cause the output of the network to behave in a similar manner. If the 
network is presented with data from an impostor, then the data correlation with the 
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correct user will be uncoffelated, causing the output of the network to behave in a 
different manner, with large variations occurring compared with the correct user. 
Therefore, the role of the network in this guise is to act as a function approximater and 
not as a classifier. 
Verification is determined by a collective measure of errors between outputs and 
targets for all the window positions. In this case we use the mean square error. This 
error criterion will give an indication of the identity of the individual. A low error will 
be exhibited by the correct user and a high error by an impostor. This requires that a 
threshold level is determined over which the user is deemed to be an impostor. This 
level may be set depending on the level of security required, such as the case in the 
statistical methods. As the main point of interest in this chapter is the training of the 
network we shall present all the results with the optimum threshold level selected, such 
that both FA and FR errors are minimised. 
7.2 Verification and CFNN 
72.1 Unbiased Data 
The network was trained firstly on the unbiased data. A minor difference 
compared with the other methods is the number of users is 20, as user 2 I's data was not 
available at the time of this experiment. The data for the training set consisted of 10 
samples from each user. The network was trained until the mean square error was 
minimised. Results for training are not shown as the network was able to train 
successfully for every user. 
Test data for the network consisted of five samples from each user. The results 
for the test data can be seen in Figure 7.1 and Table 15. Results for the CFNN on the 
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unbiased data show the variation in performance that can again be attributed to the 
variations in the consistency of the user's typing. This is clearly shown in Fi"Ure 7.1, 4-1 L" 
where user 7 (a consistent user) displays a FR error of zero and a FA error of 2% (Table 
15). This can be compared with the performance of user 20 (an inconsistent user), 
displaying a FR error of 80% and a FA error of 28%. Z-- 
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LU 
50 
c 40 
(2- 
30 
U 
CFNN Verification Unbiased Data Set 
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M False Accentance 
80 
20 
10 
2468 10 12 14 16 18 20 
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Figure 7.1 Results for CFNN verification with Unbiased Data 
The general performance of the CFNN is less severe than that of user 20. The L, 
average error over the twenty users for FR is 44% and 10% for FA. 
An example of the response of the network to a correct user and an impostor can 
be seen in Figure 7.2. The plots show the output of the network attempting to interpolate 
data produced by the legitimate user and the impostor. The input data is a 14 character 
string and a window size of 7 was chosen. This gives 13 time measurements between 
kevstroke of which, all but the last and first 3 can be compared to the network's Output 
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as the window's central element slides over them. Here the network's output can be 
seen in blue, labelled CFNN, and the user's input in red. In the first plot, the response of 
the network to the correct user is shown. It can be seen that the network is able to 
interpolate to a fair accuracy the behaviour of the user. The mean square error between 
these two plots would then be used as the criteron for verification, with the user being 
accepted for values under a certain threshold level. The second plot shows the network's 
response to the input from an impostor. Here, the network is clearly not interpolating the 
sequence of time intervals generated by the impostor at all well. The network, as 
expected, fails to fit to the user's typing behaviour and its response fluctuates 
considerably. Again, the mean square error is taken between the two plots. In this case, 
the difference between the impostor's typing behaviour and the network's response is 
much greater than that of the correct user. This would yield a MSE greater than that of 
the threshold criterion for verification and the impostor would be rejected. 
Figure 7.2 shows the output response of the network for a previously unseen 
sample from the correct user and an impostor (labelled CFNN). The correct users 
reference response is also shown (labelled USER). It can be seen from Figure 7.2 that 
the output of the CFNN is closer to the USER reference response when the correct users 
sample is presented than with the impostors. This show that correct verification is 
possible, even if the accuracy of the network response to the correct user is not that 
high. The main factor in the decision is the difference between the correct user's 
network response and the impostor's network response. As long as the impostor 
generates a response which has a much higher MSE, the correct decision will be made. 
This will also make the setting of a threshold value easier, as the large separation 
between the correct user and the impostor will allow greater freedom in the placement 
of the threshold level. 
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Figure 7.2 Example of CFNN output for the Correct User and an Impostor 
User 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FR 
FA (%) 
0.40 
0-(X) 
0.20 
0.00 
0.60 
0.09 
0.40 
0.07 
0.40 
0.07 
0.40 
0.16 
0.00 
0.02 
0.40 
0.04 
0.20 
0.07 
0.40 
0.00 
User 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Mean 
FR 
FA 
0.40 
0.23 
0.40 
OAX) 
0.60 
0.21 
0.80 
0.17 
0.60 
0.05 
0.80 
0.14 
0.20 
0.06 
0.40 
0.11 
0.40 
0.18 
0.80 
0.28 
0.44 
0.10 
Table 15 - Table of Results for CFNN with unbiased data 
7.2.2 Biased Data 
The second data set was then applied to the CFNN. Again, 10 samples were used 
in the training of the network. The training was successful for every user, therefore, 
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results are only shown for the test data. The test data consisted of 10, previously unseen, 
samples from each user. Results can be seen in Figure 7.3 and Table 16. 
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34 
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Figure 7.3 Results for CFNN Verification with Biased Data 
The biased data clearly yields better results. The biggest difference can be seen Cý 
in the FR error rate, this has decreased by 32% (Table 16). The reduction in the error 
rate for FR can be attributed to the more consistent nature of the biased data. As each 
user is typing their name, a common phrase to them, they exhibit less variance in their 
behaviour. The error rate for FA, however, has only decreased by 1% (Table 16). The 
reason for the smaller reduction in this case is again related to the consistency of the 
biased data set. The impostors are typing other people's names, which are not phrases 
that they are familiar with. As this is no different to the previous data set, the benefit of 
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a more consistent typing style amongst correct users has less of an impact on the FA 
error than it does on the FR error. However, the small decrease in the FA error is due to 
the increased consistency amongst the correct users. This increased consistency allows a 
much tighter boundary to be set around the correct user's data, whilst still maintaining a 
low FR error. The smaller the area which defines the correct users class is, the less 
likely it is that an impostor will be mistaken for the correct user. 
The ability of the CFNN to produce a distinct separation boundary between 
legitimate users and impostors with only data from the legitimate user is a feature which 
is necessary for the application of a keystroke security system. The other methods 
presented have required data from impostors during training. This is an undesirable 
requirement as this data has to be obtained or simulated [24]. 
User 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
FR 
FA 
1 
0.10 
0.08 
0.10 
0 
0 
0.18 
0.10 
0.05 
0.30 
0.15 
0.12 
0.09 
1 
Table 16 - Table of Results for CFNN Verification with Biased Data 
The table in Table 17 draws together the mean results over the two data sets for 
the methods implemented in the previous chapters. The poorest performing methods are 
the statistically based ones. In the unbiased data set the rate of FR for both statistical 
methods is comparable to the neural network techniques, but the FA error is much 
worse. To reduce the FA error to a level comparable with the neural network based 
techniques would increase the FR error to unacceptable levels. The statistical methods 
fare better with the biased data, but are still the poorest performers. The simplistic 
approach to classifying keystroke dynamics with a vector distance measure and 
threshold level is clearly not effective enough to be of practical use. 
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7.3 Comparison of Methods 
Unbiased Data Biased Data 
Method Mean 
FR 
Mean FA Mean FR Mean FA 
Statistical: Euclidean Distance 0.30 0.32 0.12 0.09 
Statistical: Manhattan Distance 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.19 
BPNN: Verification no PP 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 
BPNN: Verification with PP 0.08 0.13 - 
PNN: Euclidean Distance no PP 0.44 0.02 0.08 0.08 
PNN: Euclidean Distance with PP 0.34 0.08 - 
PNN: Manhattan Distance no PP 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.02 
PNN: Manhattan Distance with PP 0.20 0.08 - - 
CFNN 0.44 0.10 0.12 0.09 
Table 17 - Comparison Chart 
The BPNN produces good results. Its training algorithm lets it adapt to the 
complex pattern space classification boundaries. It is interesting to note that the 
performance gain in the use of data pre-processing is not as great with the BPNN as it is 
with the PNN. The improvement in the PNN for pre-processed data is about 10%, whilst 
in the BPNN it is 2%. This can be explained by the BPNN's adaptive behaviour. During 
training the weights on the network may be altered such that the inputs with a high 
inconsistency are given lower weighting. In this way it is possible for the BPNN to 
learn so that it incorporates some data pre-processing within the network itselL The 
more ridgid form of the PNN prevents this 'automatic' data-filtering effect from 
occurring, hence the pre-processed data shows a larger improvement in performance. 
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However, the BPNN has significant drawbacks. The training of the BPNN was 
effectively a trial-and-effor procedure. Choosing the number of hidden nodes, the 
learning rates and initial network weights was a non-trivial task. The network had to be 
trained several times with varying parameters in order for a satisfactory result to be 
achieved. The training itself was a drawn out process with the network taking several 
thousand epochs to come to a solution. Although the BPNN ultimately gave good 
results, this difficulty in its unpredictable training must be taken into account when 
comparing with the other methods. Another problem with the BPNN, which makes it 
unsuitable for this application, is its unpredictable behaviour once trained. Analysing 
the structure of a neural network is extremely difficult. Often the only method for 
testing the reliability of decisions made by the network is to thoroughly test it with 
thousands of samples. Even then, the reliability of the system cannot be 100% 
guaranteed, this makes such neural networks unsuitable for mission critical tasks. The 
extent to which this becomes a problem will depend largely on the final application. But 
for applications where security is important, the BPNN will not be acceptable as a 
measure of confidence in its decisions is not available. What it does hint at, especially in 
the identification role, is the extent of the uniqueness which keystroke data contains. 
The PNN displays a large difference in performance between the Euclidean and 
Manhattan distance measures. The gain in performance for the Manhattan distance is 
around 10% in both cases. Its performance is clearly the best when applied to the biased 
data set. Here is outshines the other methods as it is the only one which has an FR error 
of zero coupled with the lowest FA rate of just 2%. This beats the BPNN by 6% in both 
FA and FR, showing its potential as a candidate for a final application. Apart from its 
obvious performance benefits, it also has some functional benefits over the BPNN. Its 
structured topology is much easier to analyse than the BPNN. The network is based on 
robust Bayesian theory and its output is consistent. This makes the problem of 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 88 
Cascade Forward Neural Network 
measuring the confidence of decisions an easier task. Training is another performance 
gain with the PNN, it merely needs to 'read' the training data. As this procedure 
doesn't rely on randomised initial weights, the performance of the network is consistent 
every time. The network also has a parallel structure. This would make it possible to 
add or remove users from the system without the need to retrain. The BPNN would 
require the intensive retraining process to be carried out on every change of user. The 
disadvantage of the PNN's parallel structure is, as is the case with most radial basis 
networks, a larger number of nodes than the BPNN. Therefore, it is more 
computationally intensive in operation. Its parallel structure does enable the use of 
parallel processing if increased speed were required. So this problem may be overcome 
by the addition of more hardware. The PNN is also easier to set parameters for than the 
BPNN. Once the distance measure function has been chosen there is only one more 
parameter that needs to be set. This is the spread value and controls the spread of the 
gaussian function in the middle layer. This parameter is easily adjusted as variability of 
its value has only a small effect on the operation of the network. 
The CFNN performance is considerably worse than the other methods on the 
unbiased data and tolerable on the biased data. However, its performance is achieved 
without the prior knowledge of the impostors typing behaviour. This is a desirable 
attribute for a final application. The network is very time sensitive to the keystroke data. 
it can fit to the correct users typing pattern, but only with a considerable amount of 
training. However, this difficulty in fitting to a user's data can make it very strong 
against impostors. This time sensitivity can make the network unstable when 
inconsistent data is applied. This is the reason for the large 34% difference in the FR 
error rate between the unbiased and biased data set. The more inconsistent nature of the 
unbiased data is a difficult task for the CFNN. The increased consistency of the biased 
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data allows the network to fit with greater ease. The CFNN also suffers from the trial- 
and-effor based problems in setting parameters that plague the BPNN. However, the 
novel method in which the CFNN approaches the task does give it an advantage in 
suitability over the BPNN. The CFNN has shown a great deal of promise in this 
application and it is worthy of further study. 
7.4 Summary 
The CFNN has been presented as a novel method for the verification of 
keystroke dynamics. The network has been shown to distinguish legitimate users from 
impostors by training on data from the legitimate user only. The networks performance 
has been shown to be good in comparison with the other methods presented, given the 
lower data requirements for training. It can be seen that the CFNN is a promising 
method that gives good results for consistent users. The biased data gives results which 
are on a par with the other methods without the need for the network to be trained on the 
impostor samples. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
The probabilistic neural network has been successfully applied to the task of 
keystroke recognition. It has been shown to perform better than the BPNN and 
statistical techniques with 6% improvement in FA and FR over the traditional BPNN 
approach. A method of pre-processing the keystroke time intervals has been 
implemented and its effects shown to help reduce the FR error for a small increase in 
FA error. The features that make up a keystroke sample have been discussed. It has 
been shown that there is a distinct pattern in the way people type and that it may be fully 
exploited to reinforce password security. Our results highlight the PNN and CFNN as 
strong candidates for this application. 
The PNN, by nature, has several advantages inherent in its structure when 
compared to other networks. Advantages such as data removal/addition without re- 
training and parallel processing are particularly suited to this application, allowing new 
users to be added and old ones removed with minimal disruption (a BPNN would 
require time-consuming re-training). The PNN implementation does produce a 
significantly larger network than the BPNN, with each training sample allocated to a 
node in the pattern layer. However, the parallel nature of the PNN lends itself easily to 
implementation with parallel processing. The PNN is also shown to be more predictable 
than its BPNN counterpart and hence more suited to a mission critical application such 
as security. 
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Using the Manhattan distance measure in place of the Euclidean distance 
measure has yielded significant improvements of over 10% in performance for the 
PNN. The choice of distance measure has been demonstrated to have greater effect 
when outlier data is present in the samples. 
Problems encountered with outlier data are a major factor affecting the 
performance of all the neural networks presented. The pre-processing of data using z. 
scores has been implemented. It offers a method of reducing FR errors, but has been 
shown to have a small but undesirable effect on the FA errors. 
We have demonstrated a novel approach using a CFNN to interpolate typing 
characteristics. The difference between the CFNN output and the actual sequence can be 
evaluated, with a large difference indicating an impostor. We have used a basic 
interpolation scheme to perform pattern classification with high success rates with the 
added benefit that the network is very easy to implement, as the windowing is a pre- 
processing function. 
This work shows that keystroke dynamics provides a method of securing 
passwords without the need for any extra hardware. The uniqueness of keystroke timing 
data amongst users is clearly distinguishable with pattern recognition techniques. The 
performance of the PNN on the biased data is close to meeting acceptable error levels 
that would be required for a truly secure system. It is evident, however, that there is still 
scope for further research in this area. 
8.1 Further Work 
Keystroke dynamics is an area of biometric identification that has received the 
attention of only a few research studies. As such, there is still a great deal of work that 
may be pursued on the subject. For instance, the consistency of the typing samples is a 
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major problem in keystroke dynamics. Users that are more consistent allow tighter 
decision boundaries and therefore better distinction between classes, resulting in lower 
effors. A method of determining the consistency and suitability of a user's typing style 
would be useful. As these inconsistent features are applied to the network, some 
weighting may be applied so that less reliable ones do not confuse the classifier. It has 
been shown in this thesis that the BPNN may automatically compensate for this in its 
weights. A method of adapting the BPNN as a feature selector on the front of a PNN or 
CFNN network may increase performance and is therefore an area for further research. 
A method for determining the optimal spread function for the PNN would bring 
performance gains. This decision could be based on the output of a technique that 
detennines the consistency of the user. 
Feature extraction of the keystroke dynamic data requires more work. Whilst the 
z-score test provides a method for pre processing the data which gives improved results, 
no doubt there is a more elegant solution to this problem. 
The use of keystroke dynamics with other keyboard-based behaviour 
classification could be explored. For example, there are often many different ways of 
accomplishing the same task on a PC, such as copy and pasting. It is possible to copy 
and paste using the keyboard shortcuts, the toolbar buttons or the menu bar items. A 
system may learn the specific traits of a user with regard to these tasks and suspect an 
impostor if the pattern of behaviour deviates from that of the regular user. 
The use of keystroke dynamics for the typing of numbers such as credit card 0 
codes or telephone numbers is an area for further exploration. 
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Appendices 
8.2 Appendix A- Keystroke Capture Program 
Keystroke time capture program 
By Steven Shorrock 1/11/98 
Motorola MC68000 Assembly Code 
outport EQU $FEOOA1 * address of output port 
status EQU $FEOOA3 * address of status register 
prog EQU $1000 
data EQU $2000 
timesu EQU $3000 
timesp EQU $4000 
outrdy EQU 0* location of output ready bit 
inprdy EQU 1* location of input ready bit 
stkptr EQU $97E 
if EQU $OA 
cr EQU $OD 
start ORG prog 
LEA stkptr, A7 
* Main program loop 
choice LEA mes6, A5 
BSR outstr 
BSR inpchr 
CMP. B #'c', DO 
BEQ capture 
CMP. B #'s', DO 
BEQ save 
" loads first menu 
" prints to screen 
" receives user input 
" chooses capture/save/quit 
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CMP #'q', DO 
BEQ f inish 
LEA errl, A5 
BSR outstr 
BRA choice 
End main program loop 
Capture: Saves the persons name and then gets their 
username and password so that they can be compared with 
that of the future samples. 
capture MOVE. L #O, samnum * resets sample number to 0 
LEA mes4, A5 * asking to type persons name 
BSR outstr * print to screen 
LEA name, A5 
BSR inputst stores name 
MOVE. L #$3000, lastu 
MOVE. L #$4000, lastp sets values for lastu lastp 
LEA mes5, A5 * please enter username & password 
BSR outstr 
LEA mesl, A5 * username prompt 
BSR outstr 
LEA compu, A5 * stores comparison username at compu 
BSR inputst 
LEA mes2, A5 * password prompt 
BSR outstr 
LEA compp, A5 * stores comparison password at compp 
BSR inputst 
LEA mes7, A5 * ******data capture******* starts 
BSR outstr 
Cap: this is the menu loop for obtaining the 
keystroke timing data. 
cap LEA mesl, A5 Please enter username 
BSR outstr 
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LEA user, A5 * sets storage area for username 
LEA tuser, A6 
CLR. L DO * clears DO so character echo is on 
BSR inpstr * obtains timing data 
LEA mes2, A5 * Password prompt 
BSR outstr 
LEA pass, A5 * sets storage area for password 
LEA tpass, A6 
MOVE. L #1, DO * sets echo off and asterisks on 
BSR inpstr * obtains timing data 
LEA endl, A5 *line feed & carriage return 
BSR outstr 
LEA mes8, A5 * acce 
BSR outstr 
BSR inpchr 
CMP. B #Ifl, DO 
BEQ fini * IF f 
CMP. B #Irl, DO 
BEQ cap IF r 
BSR compare ELSE 
LEA mes12, A5 disp 
BSR outstr 
MOVE. L samnum, DO 
BSR outnum 
BRA cap loop 
* accept reJect finish 
* IF f THEN goto finish 
" IF r THEN goto cap (rejects sample) 
" ELSE goto compare (check typed correctly) 
" display number of samples 
Fini: this finishes the capturing 
fini BSR compare * compares the last sample 
LEA mes12, A5 
BSR outstr * display number of samples 
MOVE. L samnum, DO 
BSR outnum 
BRA choice back to main program loop 
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Save: this prints the timing data to screen, this can 
be saved to disk through the 68000 softlog command 
save LEA mesll, A5 
BSR outstr prints the persons name 
LEA name, A5 
BSR outstr 
LEA mes9, A5 
BSR outstr 
LEA $3000, A5 
LEA lastu, A6 
BSR display prints the username times 
LEA meslO, A5 
BSR outstr 
LEA $4000, A5 
LEA lastp, A6 
BSR display prints the password times 
LEA endl, A5 
BSR outstr 
finish LEA endl, A5 * line feed & carriage return 
BSR outstr 
TRAP #15 * Interrupt processor 
DC. W $10 * send Halt command to processor 
Compare: checks to make sure the username and password 
that the user typed corresponds with the origionals and 
that the counter has not overflowed 
compare LEA user, A5 
LEA compu, A6 
loop2 CMPM. B (AS)+, (A 
BNE error2 
CMP. B #0, (A6) 
BNE loop2 
point to current username 
point to stored comparison origional 
6)+ compare 
" if not equal error 
" IF not at end of username 
" THEN loop back 
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LEA pass, A5 same as above for password 
LEA compp, A6 
loop3 CMPM. B (A5)+, (A6)+ 
BNE error2 
CMP. B #0, (A6) 
BNE loop3 
LEA tuser, A5 point to timings for username 
testu CMP. L #$0009FFFF, (A5) 
BGT error IF counter has overflowed error 
CMP. L #0, (A5)+ Keep going through all samples 
BNE testu 
LEA tpass, A5 same for password 
testp CMP. L #$0009FFFF, (AS) 
BGT error 
CMP. L #0, (A5)+ 
BNE testp 
store MOVEA. L lastu, A5 store correct timing data 
LEA tuser, A6 
loop4 MOVE. L (A6)+, (A5)+ 
BNE loop4 
MOVE. L A5, lastu 
storep MOVEA. L lastp, A5 
LEA tpass, A6 
loop5 MOVE. L (A6)+, (A5)+ 
BNE loop5 
MOVE. L A5, lastp 
MOVE. L samnum, DO 
ADD #1, DO add one to correct samples number 
MOVE. L DO, samnum 
RTS 
error2 LEA err3, A5 displays wrong username 
BSR outstr 
RTS 
error LEA err, A5 displays too long a pause (overflow) 
BSR outstr 
RTS 
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Display: this prints the timing sample to screen 
display MOVE. L (A5)+, DO * get the first time interval 
MOVEA. L A5, A4 * save A5 as outnum. uses it 
BSR outnum * print it to screen 
MOVEA. L A4, A5 * reload A5 
CMP. L #0, (A5) * check for end 
BNE display * ELSE repeat 
LEA endl, A5 * line feed 
BSR outstr 
MOVEA. L A4, A5 * reload A5 
ADD #4, A5 * increment A5 by a longword (1 sample) 
CMP. L (A6), A5 * IF at end of sample THEN RTS 
BLT display * ELSE repeat 
RTS 
Subroutine: inpstr 
Receives characters and the delays between key 
presses. Outputs a "I after each character if 
DO is set to 11' 
inpstr2 CMP #1, DO * check for echo flag 
BNE inpstr3 * IF echo on goto inpstr3 
MOVE. B #1*1, outport * ELSE echo asterisk to screen 
BRA inpstr * skip next line 
inpstr3 MOVE. B -1(A5), outport *echo character to screen 
inpstr CLR. L D3 * clear counter, start polling loop 
inpstrl ADDQ. L #1, D3 * add one to counter 
BTST #inprdy, status * IF keypress THEN stop 
BEQ inpstrl * ELSE repeat adding to counter 
MOVE. L D3, (A6)+ * store timing data 
MOVE. B outport, (A5) * store key that was pressed 
CMP. B #$OD, (A5)+ IF carriage return pressed THEN RTS 
BNE inpstr2 ELSE repeat 
MOVE. L #0, (A6) 
RTS 
Subroutine: outstr 
Takes the start of message in A5 
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and outputs to screen 
outstr BTST #outrdy, status * check output is ready 
BEQ outstr * poll outrdy 
MOVE. B (A5), outport * display character 
CMP. B #0, (A5)+ IF end THEN RTS 
BNE outstr ELSE repeat 
RTS 
Subroutine: outnum 
The number in DO is output to the screen 
outnum MOVE. L #6, D2 
LEA num+ 8, Al 
MOVE. L DO, Dl 
SWAP DO 
CMP. W #9, DO 
BGT toobig 
SWAP DO 
rep DIVU #10, Dl 
SWAP Dl 
MOVE. B Dl, DO 
ADD. B #$30, DO 
MOVE. B DO, -(Al) 
LSR. L #8, Dl 
LSR. L #8, Dl 
TST Dl 
BEQ exit 
SUB #1, D2 
BNE rep 
exit MOVE. B (Al)+, DO 
BSR outchr 
CMP #num+8, Al 
BNE exit 
MOVE. B V ', DO 
BSR outchr 
RTS 
toobig LEA mes3, A5 
BSR outstr 
RTS 
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outchr: display a single character 
outchr BTST #outrdy, status * poll outrdy bit 
BEQ outchr 
MOVE. B DO, outport * print to screen 
RTS 
inpchr TRAP #15 
DC. W $11 inputs a character, DO contains value 
RTS 
inputst: inputs a string, making sure it is less than 20 
characters (for name) 
inputst CLR. L Dl * clear character counter 
MOVEA. L A5, A6 * set initial conditions for inpchr 
inputl BSR inpchr 
MOVE. B DO, (A6)+ * save character 
MOVE. B DO, outport echo character 
ADD #1, Dl add one to counter 
CMP #19, D1 check character counter is less than 20 
BGT overflo IF >20 error 
CMP #$OD, DO check for carriage return 
BNE inputl ELSE repeat 
MOVE. B #0, (A6) mark end of string with a 101 
RTS 
overflo MOVEA. L A5, A4 * save AS 
LEA err2, A5 * output error msg 
BSR outstr 
MOVEA. L A4, A5 
CLR. L D1 * start again 
BRA inputl 
***************************************************************** 
ORG data 
user DS. B 20 
pass DS. B 20 
name DS. B 20 
compu DS. B 20 
compp DS. B 20 
lastu DS. L 1 
lastp DS. L 1 
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mesl DC. B cr, lf, cr, lf, 'Please type (username): 1,0 
mes2 DC. B cr, lf, 'Please type (password): 1,0 
mes3 DC. B Itoobig 1,0 
mes4 DC. B cr, lf, '***Set-up***I, cr, lf, 'Please enter your name: 1,0 
mes5 DC. B cr, lf, 'Please enter your username and password, ', O 
mes6 DC. B cr, lf, 'Please choose capture/save or quit (C/S/q): ', 0 
mes7 DC. B cr, lf, '***Data capture***I, cr, lf, O 
mes8 DC. B cr, lf, 'Accept? Reject? Finish? (a/r/f)', O 
mes9 DC. B cr, lf, lusername times: ', cr, lf, O 
mes1O DC. B cr, lf, 'Password times: ', cr, lf, O 
mesll DC. B cr, lf, 'Name: ', 0 
mes12 DC. B cr, lf, 'Number of samples - 1,0 
err DC. B lf, cr, lerror! too long a pausel, lf, cr, O 
errl DC. B cr, lf, lerror, try again', cr, lf, O 
err2 DC. B cr, lf, 'error! max characters 20, try againl, cr, lf, O 
err3 DC. B cr, lf, 'wrong username or password, try againl, cr, lf, O 
endl DC. B cr, lf, O 
num DS. B 10 
tuser DS. L 200 
tpass DS. L 200 
samnum DS. L 1 
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 109 
8.3 Appendix B- Graphs of Statistical Results 
These graphs show the FAIFR plots of all the users for the statistical methods. 
The red line represents FA error the blue line FR error. 
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